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I. Introduction and Executive Summary 
 
Under Section 83 of the Green Communities Act (“GCA”), Chapter 169 of the Acts of 
2008, the Commonwealth’s electric distribution companies (“Distribution Companies”) 
were required, after consultation with the Department of Energy Resources (“DOER”), 
to solicit proposals from developers of renewable energy projects and to execute long-
term power purchase agreements (“PPAs”) for energy and/or renewable energy 
certificates (“RECs”) in order to facilitate the development, financing, and construction 
of these projects, subject to the approval of the PPAs by the Department of Public 
Utilities (“Department” or “DPU”).  The Distribution Companies, in consultation with 
DOER, issued a Request for Proposal (“RFP”), which ultimately resulted in the execution 
by three Distribution Companies of five PPAs for approximately 150 MW of generation 
for new renewable energy projects, which were then approved by the Department.1 
Separately, National Grid2 received authorization from the Department to negotiate a 
PPA with Cape Wind Associates, LLC (“Cape Wind”)3 which was subsequently executed 
and approved by the Department.4 
In August 2012, Governor Patrick signed into law Chapter 209 of the Acts of 2012, An 
Act Relative to Competitively Priced Electricity in the Commonwealth (“Chapter 209”). 
Under Section 36 of Chapter 209, a new and expanded version of Section 83 was 
enacted, Section 83A, which increases the number of solicitations the Distribution 
Companies are required to conduct, beginning on January 1, 2013, and modifies the 
procurement process in various respects.  
The solicitation process under Section 83A, however, cannot take effect until DOER has 
“completed a study to assess whether the long-term contracting requirements 
                                                          
1 NSTAR Electric Company, D.P.U. 11-05, 11-06, 11-07 (August 19, 2011), Western Massachusetts Electric Company, D.P.U. 11-12 
(October 7, 2011), Fitchburg Gas and Electric Company, d/b/a Unitil, D.P.U. 11-30 (December 7, 2011).  
2
 Massachusetts Electric Company and Nantucket Electric Company each d/b/a National Grid. 
 
3 National Grid, D.P.U. 09-138 (December 29, 2009). 
4 National Grid, D.P.U. 10-154 (November 22, 2010). 
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reasonably support the renewable energy goals of the commonwealth as required 
under section 83 of chapter 169 of the acts of 2008 and said study has been submitted 
to the clerks of the house of representatives and the senate and to the chairs of the 
joint committee on telecommunications, utilities and energy.”  Moreover, “[t]he study 
shall include, but not be limited to, input from stakeholders in the energy sector.”  The 
requirement for a study is similar to the assessment required in Section 83 of the GCA as 
to “whether the requirements set forth in this section reasonably support the 
renewable energy goals of the commonwealth as set forth in said section 11F of said 
chapter 25A,” the Massachusetts Renewable Portfolio Standard (“RPS”).  The purpose of 
this report is to fulfill these requirements. 
Following the passage of Chapter 209, DOER sought competitive bids from consultants 
to prepare the study.  Peregrine Energy Group, Inc. (“Peregrine”), in conjunction with 
New Energy Opportunities, Inc. (“New Energy Opportunities” or “NEO”), submitted a 
proposal, and was subsequently awarded the contract, to conduct the study.5 
This report is organized as follows: 
 Section II summarizes the statutory and regulatory support for the solicitations 
conducted under Section 83, the solicitations and resulting PPAs,  and the 
current status of the projects for which the 83 contracts were executed; 
 Section III provides an assessment of the role of Section 83 PPAs in meeting 
Massachusetts RPS goals; and 
 Section IV assesses the reasonableness of the implementation of Section 83 with 
suggestions for future improvements.  
In the course of preparing this report, Peregrine and NEO interviewed representatives of 
23 companies and organizations in order to obtain input from stakeholders in the 
energy sector.  Interviewees included representatives from the four Distribution 
Companies who conducted solicitations under Section 83,6 11 renewable energy 
developers who participated in the Section 83 solicitations,  five organizational 
stakeholders—the Associated Industries of Massachusetts (“AIM”), Conservation Law 
                                                          
5 The qualifications of Peregrine and New Energy Opportunities, including the consultants primarily responsible for authoring this report, are 
summarized in Appendix A to this report. 
6 Since the solicitations were conducted, two of the Distribution Companies, NSTAR Electric Company and Western Massachusetts Electric 
Company, are now under common ownership as the result of the Northeast Utilities/NSTAR merger. 
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Foundation (“CLF”), New England Clean Energy Council, New England Power Generators 
Association (“NEPGA”) and the Solar Energy Industries Association, financial investors (a 
renewable energy lender and a tax equity provider), and Robert Grace, President of 
Sustainable Energy Advantage, LLC, a renewable energy market analyst. 
Of the five projects which received PPAs from the RFP process, four projects (three wind 
and one hydroelectric) have either been built or are in construction.  The developers of 
these projects have stated publicly and in the interviews conducted that the PPAs 
executed with the Distribution Companies were critically important in their ability to 
finance and build their projects.  Cape Wind, which also has signed a PPA with NSTAR 
Electric Company (“NSTAR”), has publicly stated that the two contracts should enable it 
to obtain financing for its project.  
Based on the interviews conducted, our review of the solicitations, and our knowledge 
of the electric power industry, our major conclusions are as follows: 
 Long-term contracts for energy and RECs are, and will be, necessary for 
Massachusetts to meet the goals under its RPS with respect to Class I Renewable 
Generating Units; 
 There are an insufficient number of creditworthy entities willing to enter into 
long-term contracts with renewable energy developers for multi-MW grid-
connected projects in the absence of a mandate on the Distribution Companies 
to do so; 
 The long-term contracting requirements under Section 83 reasonably fulfill the 
need for long-term contracts and reasonably support the renewable energy 
goals of the commonwealth; 
 There was a general consensus that the RFP process employed under Section 83 
was, for the most part, well conducted, fair and produced good results; 
 There were a few shortcomings in the solicitation process under Section 83, 
which can, and are likely to be, rectified in future Section 83A solicitations, 
because of modifications to future solicitation processes mandated by Section 
83A and as a result of “lessons learned” from the Section 83 procurements. 
The starting point for our assessment is an overview of the Massachusetts RPS, Section 
83, the solicitations conducted under Section 83, and the new Section 83A. 
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II. Background: The Massachusetts RPS, Long-Term Contracting Policies 
and the History of the Section 83 Solicitations 
A. The Massachusetts Renewable Portfolio Standard: Class I 
Under the Massachusetts Renewable Portfolio Standard, all retail electric suppliers, including 
the Distribution Companies in their role as standard offer service providers, are required to 
purchase RECs from Class I renewable energy generating resources in an increasing amount 
each year—from seven percent in 2012 increasing one percent each year thereafter as a 
percentage of total sales to 10 percent in 2015 and 15% in 2020.  Class I renewable energy 
resources include wind, small hydro, and other defined renewable generating resources that 
began commercial operation after December 31, 1997.  Under DOER’s regulations, these “new” 
facilities (post-1997) include the energy associated with expansions of existing facilities.7   
Geographically, a qualifying Class I Renewable Generating Unit may be located in the ISO-New 
England control area or in an adjoining control area (New York, Atlantic Canada and northern 
Maine, and Quebec).  Facilities located in an adjoining control area are subject to special energy 
delivery and other requirements.8  Under DOER regulations, the retail electric suppliers are 
required to document the required amount of Class I Renewable Generation Attributes through 
certificates issued by the NEPOOL Generation Information System for electric energy produced 
by qualifying Class I Renewable Generation Units, with one MWh of energy produced by one 
Class I Renewable Generation Unit correlating to one REC. 
Retail electric suppliers are also required to purchase a percentage—specified by DOER—of 
their sales from distributed solar photovoltaic (“solar PV”) generation sited in the 
Commonwealth—the “Solar Carve Out” requirement.9  The solicitations conducted under 
                                                          
7
 225 CMR 14.05(2). 
8
 225 CMR 14.05(5). 
9 This obligation to purchase solar renewable energy certificates is carved out of the obligation to 
purchase Class I RECs.  There are also separate requirements for retail electric suppliers to purchase (a) 
Class II RECs from existing renewable resources built on or before December 31, 1997—Class II RPS 
resources—and (b) Alternative Electric Certificates from certain non-renewable alternative resources, 
such as combined heat and power, under the Alternative Electric Portfolio Standard, Section 11F1/2 of 
Chapter 25A. 
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Section 83 which are the subject of this report, however, focused on energy and RECs from 
Class I Renewable Generating Units with a minimum size of 1 MW.10  
If a retail electric supplier does not have access to sufficient amounts of Class I RECs, the 
supplier may instead make an Alternative Compliance Payment (“ACP”).  The ACP Rate for RPS 
Class I is $50 per MWh in 2003, adjusted with inflation.  In 2012, the ACP Rate is $64.02/MWh.  
Class I REC prices have moved up and down over the past 8-9 years and have increased sharply 
in the past year, now in the range of $60—close to the ACP.   
The Massachusetts Class I RPS market is part of a larger market for RECs from new renewable 
generation projects.  Four of the five other New England states have their own Renewable 
Portfolio Standards with categories for renewable generation that are somewhat similar to, 
although different from, the Massachusetts RPS Class I.11   Each state’s RPS statute and 
regulations define the RPS eligibility of generation a bit differently, and the definitions can 
change over time. 
The recent increase in Massachusetts Class I REC prices have primarily been due to the 
challenge in financing and building new renewable generation to keep up with the increasing 
demand for Massachusetts Class I RECs.  The recognition of this challenge led to the 
Massachusetts General Court’s passage of Section 83 of the GCA in 2008. 
 
                                                          
10 This report focuses on the solicitations conducted under Section 83 during 2009-2011.  Subsequently, NSTAR conducted a RFP for S-RECs 
from approximately 5 MW of eligible solar project capacity, 
http://www.nstar.com/business/energy_supplier/supply_renewable_contracts.asp, but that RFP is addressed in this report in the context of 
issues raised with respect to the 2009-2011 Section 83 solicitations.  
11 Rhode Island has a Renewable Energy Standard for post-December 1997 renewable energy resources, 
http://www.ripuc.ri.gov/utilityinfo/RESRules(7-25-07).pdf; New Hampshire has a Class I renewable energy 
standard for renewable energy resources built after January 2006, 
http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive_Code=NH09R%20%20; Connecticut Class I has 
similar technologies to Massachusetts Class I, but no vintage requirement and an emissions rate requirement  for 
biomass, http://www.ct.gov/pura/cwp/view.asp?a=3354&q=415186; Maine’s Class I RPS is for new renewable 
energy resources built, expanded or refurbished after September 1, 2005, but with fewer restrictions on biomass 
eligibility, http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive_Code=ME01R.  
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B. Section 83 of the GCA and the Department’s Regulations 
Section 83 of the GCA required the Commonwealth’s investor-owned electric distribution 
companies to “solicit proposals from renewable energy developers and, provided reasonable 
proposals have been received, enter into cost-effective long-term contracts to facilitate the 
financing of renewable energy generation ....”  Distribution companies were required to solicit 
proposals twice during a five-year period for energy and/or RECs.   They were not required to 
purchase more than three percent of their total distribution demand.  The distribution 
companies were required to consult with DOER regarding the “timetable and method for 
solicitation and execution of such contracts” and to submit and obtain approval from the DPU 
with respect to such timetable and solicitation method.  Contracts could be 10 to 15 years in 
duration. 
There was considerable flexibility as to how the Distribution Companies could satisfy their 
obligations under Section 83, “which may include public solicitations, individual negotiations or 
other methods.”  Distribution companies, however, were required to consult with DOER 
regarding their choice of contracting methods and solicitation methods.  All executed contracts 
were subject to DPU approval. 
The statute provided that eligible renewable energy facilities must be located in Massachusetts 
or adjacent federal waters.  However, Section 83 also provided: 
If any provision of this section is subject to a judicial challenge, the department of public 
utilities may suspend the applicability of the challenged provision during the pendency 
of the judicial action until final resolution of the challenge and any appeals, and shall 
issue such orders and take such other actions as are necessary to ensure that the 
provisions that are not challenged are implemented expeditiously to achieve the public 
purposes of this provision.  
Section 83 set forth the requirements to be applied by the DPU in its review of any contracts 
submitted for approval.  Any renewable energy project which would be the source of supply 
must: 
 have a commercial operation date on or after January 1, 2008; 
 be qualified by DOER as eligible to participate in the RPS program;  
 be determined by the DPU to:  
o provide enhanced electricity reliability within the commonwealth;  
o contribute to moderating system peak load requirements;  
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o be cost effective to Massachusetts electric ratepayers over the term of the 
contract; and  
o where feasible, create additional employment in the Commonwealth. 
The DPU was directed to “take into consideration both the potential costs and benefits of such 
contracts, and shall approve a contract only upon a finding that it is a cost effective mechanism 
for procuring renewable energy on a long-term basis.”  Distribution companies that enter into 
power purchase agreements approved by the DPU were entitled to remuneration of “4 per cent 
of the annual payments under the contract to compensate the company for accepting the 
financial obligation of the long-term contract.”12 
In comments filed to the DPU, DOER proposed to develop a statewide procurement under 
Section 83, with the assistance of consultants it had retained, in conjunction with the 
Distribution Companies.  This proposal, which was supported by the Attorney General, was 
recognized by the DPU in its regulations adopted in June 2009.  The regulations provided that 
“Distribution companies shall consider participating in a DOER-administered solicitation process 
prior to conducting their own solicitations.”13   
C. The Section 83 Solicitations 
As the DPU’s regulations were in the process of being finalized, DOER met with the four 
Distribution Companies, NSTAR, National Grid, Western Massachusetts Electric Company 
(“WMECO”) and Unitil14 to develop a jointly-issued RFP.  The RFP process evolved in three 
different phases.  First, in 2009, DOER and the distribution companies developed a RFP that was 
limited to Massachusetts-based renewable generation facilities.  Second, after the RFP was 
issued in February 2010, several aspects of the evaluation process, including DOER’s role, were 
modified due to potential antitrust concerns initially raised by one of the Distribution 
Companies.  Finally, due to an amendment in the Department’s regulations in response to a 
lawsuit raised by a potential out-of-state bidder, the RFP was amended to remove the 
limitation that projects need to be located in Massachusetts or the adjacent offshore federal 
                                                          
12 As part of the regulatory process, the Department was also directed to “consider the attorney general’s recommendations, which shall be 
submitted to the department of public utilities within 45 days following the filing of such contracts with the department of public utilities.”  
13 220 CMR §17.04(1).  Order Adopting Regulations, D.P.U. 08-88-A, 220 CMR 17.00 et seq. Distribution company participation was voluntary.  
However, if a distribution company were to decide to initiate its own solicitation process, it would be required to consult with DOER prior to 
any submission to the DPU for approval, include in the filing DOER’s comments on their solicitation and contracting methods, and specify 
how they responded to DOER’s questions or concerns.  220 CMR §17.04(5). 
14 Fitchburg Gas and Electric Company d/b/a Unitil. 
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domain.  A second solicitation was held with bids due in September 2010, which resulted in 
three of the distribution companies signing contracts and submitting them to the DPU for 
approval.  Separately, National Grid entered into a preliminary agreement with Cape Wind to 
negotiate a PPA, obtained approval from the DPU to negotiate with Cape Wind, and obtained 
the Department’s approval of the resulting PPA executed with Cape Wind.   
This section of the report addresses (a) these three phases of the development of the RFP 
process, (b) (i) the resulting bid evaluation, selection, and contract execution process conducted 
by the Distribution Companies and (ii) the DPU regulatory process regarding the PPAs executed 
as a result of the RFP process, and (c) the solicitation process involving National Grid and Cape 
Wind and the resulting PPA, regulatory process, and subsequent appeals.  In addition, the 
current status of the contracted projects is summarized.   Finally, Section 83A is compared to 
Section 83 in the context of suggestions for future improvements of the long-term contract 
solicitation process. 
1. Development of the Original RFP 
In early 2009, DOER retained consultants to assist in the development of a solicitation 
process.15 DOER, with the assistance of its consultants, drafted a RFP document, a bidder 
response package, and a term sheet (key commercial terms for a model power purchase 
agreement), which were circulated to the four distribution companies—NSTAR, National Grid, 
WMECO and Unitil.  In June 2009, the first meeting was held among the distribution companies 
and DOER.  For subsequent meetings, DOER and its consultants circulated issues lists based on 
comments submitted by the distribution companies on the draft RFP documents.  The meetings 
on the structure of the RFP were productive and resulted in various modifications and 
refinements to the draft solicitation documents.   
A series of issues were resolved pertaining to the role of the various distribution companies and 
DOER in the process.  In addition to DOER’s role in the development of the RFP itself, DOER 
would serve in a consultative role to the distribution companies with respect to bid evaluation 
up to and including development of a short list.  The RFP provided for the distribution 
companies to compare their bid evaluations (with DOER having the ability to review the bids) 
and the distribution companies would arrive at bid short list selections that would not be 
incompatible with each other, with DOER playing a coordinative and consultative role.  DOER 
                                                          
15 The consultants were Barry Sheingold, President of New Energy Opportunities, and Wayne Oliver, President of Merrimack Energy Group, Inc., 
NEO’s subcontractor.  The work was performed pursuant to a contract between the Massachusetts Clean Energy Center and NEO.  NEO has 
also participated in the preparation of this study as a subcontractor to Peregrine Energy Group.  
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would also play a consultative role in bid selection and PPA negotiations.  Finally, when 
executed contracts would be submitted to the DPU for approval, DOER would submit its 
assessment of the process employed by the distribution company and the merits of the 
particular PPA proposed for approval.   
Other issues addressed pertained to evaluation criteria, evaluation process and weighting of 
price and non-price factors.  A three-stage process, proposed by DOER, involved a first-stage of 
eligibility and threshold requirements, a second stage price and non-price evaluation resulting 
in a quantitative score and ranking, and a third stage in which reasoned discretion could be 
exercised based on consideration of specified criteria.  The eligibility and threshold 
requirements included statutory requirements—such as the proposed facility being a RPS-
qualifying unit built in Massachusetts (or the adjacent offshore federal domain) after January 1, 
2008, which contributes to electricity reliability with Massachusetts, contributes to moderating 
system peak load requirements, and contributes to Massachusetts employment—as well as 
other requirements typical for RFP processes of this kind, such as the demonstration of site 
control.   
The second stage evaluation (for those proposals that meet the requirements of the first stage 
evaluation) involved a price and non-price evaluation, where price factors were weighted 80 
percent and non-price factors weighted 20 percent.16  The 80/20 split was a compromise 
agreeable to the participants.   
DOER proposed, and the distribution companies agreed to, a third stage of the evaluation 
process where the distribution companies, in consultation with DOER, would determine those 
proposals that had the highest value based on consideration of the following factors: 
 Ranking in the second stage evaluation; 
 Cost effectiveness of the bids (pricing); 
 Risk associated with project viability; 
 The extent to which additional employment in Massachusetts would be created; and 
 Portfolio effect: the value of diversity of resources—by size and type of resources. 
These factors were to be considered in selecting a short list.   
                                                          
16 Non-price evaluation factors included consideration of status of siting and permitting, project development status and operational viability, 
experience and capability of the project development team, financing capability, and exceptions to the Model PPA. 
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In August 2009, the Distribution Companies, in coordination with DOER, circulated a draft RFP 
and term sheet for comment to interested renewable energy developers and other parties.  
Comments were received from a variety of developers and a renewable energy advocacy 
association.  After considering the comments, the distribution companies and DOER filed the 
proposed RFP and response package with the DPU.  A term sheet or model PPA was not 
included in the filing, but the joint petitioners stated that a model PPA would be issued with the 
RFP following DPU approval.  In addition, the filing included a high level summary of (a) the 
comments submitted on the draft RFP and (b) the extent to which they were incorporated in 
the proposed RFP submitted to the Department.   
A number of parties requested that the Department grant approval of the proposed RFP, but on 
specified conditions, including requiring that a Model PPA be filed for DPU prior approval, that 
the allocation of points between price and non-price factors be reduced from 80/20 to a ratio 
implying heavier weighting of non-price considerations, that the third stage of the evaluation 
process be eliminated on the ground that it entailed the exercise of too much discretion on the 
part of the distribution companies, and that the time period to conduct the solicitation be 
enlarged or shortened.  The Department, however, approved the proposed timetable and 
methods of solicitation contained in the RFP as being consistent with Section 83 and the 
Department’s regulations.17  The DPU generally did not want to limit the flexibility of the 
process and generally deferred to the soliciting participants.  With regard to certain issues, the 
Department recognized DOER’s “judgment and experience” and “DOER’s full support of the 
proposal” as “evidenced by its joint sponsorship of the petition.”18  On the same day, the DPU 
also approved National Grid’s proposal to negotiate a PPA with Cape Wind.19  National Grid, 
however, remained as a participant in the statewide RFP process. 
While the Distribution Companies and DOER addressed and resolved many issues in drafting 
the RFP, it was difficult to agree on a number of provisions of the Model PPA.  DOER attempted 
to address a number of concerns raised by developers and a renewable energy advocacy 
association that pertained primarily to the perceived financeability of the Model PPA.    
Following the DPU’s order authorizing the Distribution Companies, in consultation with DOER, 
to issue the proposed RFP, the terms of the Model PPA were agreed upon.  On January 15, 
                                                          
17 Order, D.P.U. 09-77 (December 29, 2009). 
18 Id. At 21- 22. 
19 Order, D.P.U. 09-138 (December 29, 2009). 
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2010, the RFP, bidder response package and Model PPA were posted on a website dedicated to 
the RFP process.   
At the same time, the details of the price and non-price evaluation methodology were being 
developed, consistent with the criteria set forth in the RFP.  The Distribution Companies, in 
consultation with DOER, retained Levitan Associates, an economic consulting firm, to develop a 
common market price forecast to be utilized in the economic evaluation of bids.   
2. Revision in the Roles of DOER and the Distribution Companies in the Bid Evaluation and 
Selection Process 
Shortly after bid submittal, one of the distribution companies, based on a legal assessment it 
had conducted, expressed to DOER and the other distribution companies that the collaborative 
approach among the distribution companies in the bid evaluation process, and DOER’s 
participation in that process, as envisaged in the RFP, raised antitrust concerns.  As a result, the 
Distribution Companies decided not to coordinate among themselves in the bid evaluation and 
short list selection part of the RFP process.  In addition, DOER agreed to withdraw from its 
consultative role with respect to the bid evaluation/bid selection/contract negotiation process.  
DOER sent a letter dated April 14, 2010 to the DPU with a copy to bidders informing them of 
this change in the process.   
As a result, the RFP process was modified to one where there were to be multiple independent 
bid evaluation/bid selection/contract negotiation processes that were conducted by each 
distribution company, with no consultative role played by DOER.  Since Section 83 and the 
DPU’s regulations only required DOER to play a consultative role with regard to the design of 
the solicitation process, and not its implementation, this did not violate Section 83 or the DPU’s 
implementing regulations.  However, it effectively eliminated DOER’s ability to monitor the 
process after the submission of bids and to address any problems that might arise other than 
on an after-the-fact basis.   
3. Removal of the Geographic Limitation on Eligible Facilities 
On April 16, 2010, TransCanada Power Marketing Ltd. (“TransCanada”) brought a lawsuit in 
federal court, alleging that Section 83, the DPU’s implementing regulations, and the RFP issued 
on January 15, 2010 discriminated against out-of-state generators in violation of the Commerce 
Clause of the United States Constitution.20  On June 9, 2010, the DPU issued emergency 
                                                          
20 TransCanada Power Marketing Ltd. V. Bowles, Civil Action No. 4:10-cv-40070-FDS (D. Mass. April 16, 2010). 
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regulations, ultimately finalized, which removed the geographic limitation that an eligible 
renewable energy facility needed to be located “within the jurisdictional boundaries of the 
[C]ommonwealth, including state waters or adjacent federal waters” and removed the 
requirement that where feasible, additional employment be created “in the 
[C]ommonwealth.”21  The DPU directed the Distribution Companies, in consultation with 
DOER, to reopen the RFP for a reasonable time to allow out-of-state generators to submit 
proposals.22   In doing so, the DPU stated that “the distribution companies should be mindful 
of the express language of the statute, which calls upon distribution companies to ‘enter into 
cost-effective long-term contracts to facilitate the financing of renewable energy generation.’ 
St. 2008, c. 169 § 83 (emphasis added).”23 
At the time the DPU issued the emergency regulations, NSTAR had already executed three PPAs 
and WMECO and Unitil were at an advanced stage of bid evaluation and selection.24   NSTAR 
submitted the three PPAs to the DPU for approval, but in light of the emergency regulations, 
they were denied without prejudice.25 
On July 14, 2010, the Distribution Companies, in consultation with DOER, submitted an 
amended RFP to the DPU for approval (“Amended RFP”).  Under the proposed Amended RFP:  
 The geographic limitation on eligible facilities was eliminated; 
 The requirement that additional employment be created “in the 
Commonwealth” was eliminated; 
 Consistent with the April 14, 2010 letter filed by DOER with the Department, the 
RFP was modified to remove (a) any collaborative process between the 
Distribution Companies and (b) DOER’s consultative role during the bid 
evaluation, bid selection, and contract negotiation process; 
 In order to enhance the consideration of “facilitating financing” in the RFP 
process: 
                                                          
21 Order Adopting Emergency Regulations, D.P.U. 10-58 (June 9, 2010); Order Adopting Final Regulations, D.P.U. 10-58-A (August 20, 2010). 
22 Order Adopting Emergency Regulations at 6. 
23 Id. 
24 National Grid had already signed a PPA with Cape Wind through a negotiated process approved by the DPU. 
25 Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice, D.P.U. 10-71, 10-72, and 10-73 (August 13, 2010). 
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o Bidders were asked the extent to which obtaining a PPA in the RFP 
process would facilitate the financing of their  project; 
o Facilitating financing was added as a consideration in both the non-price 
evaluation and in the third stage of the evaluation process. 
In preparation for the economic evaluation of bids from facilities located outside of 
Massachusetts, the Distribution Companies procured from Levitan Associates a forecast of 
energy LMPs for locations in ISO-New England but outside Massachusetts (in addition to the 
forecast for Massachusetts locations previously provided).   
On August 27, 2010, the DPU approved the timetable and methods of solicitation embodied in 
the Amended RFP.26  On September 2, 2010, the Amended RFP was issued and posted on the 
website developed by the Distribution Companies and DOER for the solicitation.27 
Bids were submitted in early October 2010.  NSTAR received proposals for 74 renewable energy 
projects totaling 2,513 MW and representing 7.5 million MWh/year.28  WMECO and Unitil also 
received a large number of proposals.29  Many developers submitted proposals for sales from 
the same projects to multiple utility buyers.   
Several months later, NSTAR entered into three PPAs with wind energy projects with a total 
installed capacity of approximately 109 MW (one of which was located in Massachusetts), 
WMECO entered into one PPA with a 37.5 MW wind energy project, and Unitil entered into one 
PPA with a 2.2 MW expansion of a hydroelectric project. 
4. The DPU Proceedings for Approval of the PPAs 
On January 31, 2011, WMECO filed its petition for approval of the PPA it had executed pursuant 
to the Amended RFP, followed by NSTAR’s submission in February of its petitions for approval 
of the three PPAs it had executed, and Unitil’s application for approval of its PPA in mid-March.  
                                                          
26 Order, D.P.U. 10-76 (August 27, 2010).    
27 www.massachusettsrenewableenergyrfp.com.  
28 NSTAR Electric Company, D.P.U. 11-05, 11-06, 11-07 (August 19, 2011) at 42. D.P.U. 11-05, 11-06, and 11-07 (May 27, 2011) at 8. 
29WMECO received conforming bid proposals for 87 different renewable energy projects.  Testimony of Judy Chang and Jurgen Weiss, 
Witnesses for the Attorney General (“Chang/Weiss Testimony”),  D.P.U. 11-12 (June 21, 2011) at 8.  Unitil received a total of 105 bids from 49 
bidders representing 84 individual projects. 29 Chang/Weiss Testimony, D.P.U. 11-30 (July 15, 2011) at 8. 
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Expert witnesses for the Attorney General testified that the three distribution companies acted 
in conformance with the guidelines set forth in the Amended RFP in terms of their evaluation of 
the bids and bid selection.  DOER supported approval of all of the PPAs.  No party in any of the 
proceedings opposed the petitions.30  The Department approved all of the PPAs.  Generally 
speaking, the path to regulatory approval was straightforward and noncontroversial.  The 
NSTAR proceedings were expedited at the request of one of the developers.  All in all, the 
proceedings took between six to nine months from filing of petitions to DPU decisions. 
NSTAR 
After having concluded the second evaluation stage, NSTAR “targeted” the nine top-ranked bids 
for further evaluation.  NSTAR sought improved pricing from these bidders.  NSTAR then short 
listed four proposals.  The other five involved existing or other facilities for which NSTAR 
determined that contracts in this solicitation would not facilitate financing, based on the 
representations of the bidders.  One shortlisted bidder dropped out.  NSTAR signed contracts 
with the remaining three bids, which were wind projects.  Expected energy output from the 
three wind projects represented 1.6 percent of NSTAR’s distribution load.  Two projects—the 
28.5 MW Hoosac project located in Massachusetts and the 48 MW Groton project located in 
Maine—were being developed by subsidiaries of Iberdrola.  The other project—the 32.4 MW 
Blue Sky project located in Maine—was being developed by a subsidiary of First Wind.  Both 
Iberdrola and First Wind are experienced wind energy developers with successful track records.  
While the pricing of the PPAs were treated as confidential information, as had the PPAs NSTAR 
had previously executed with in-state projects pursuant to the Initial RFP issued in January 2010 
(“Initial RFP”), NSTAR indicated that the weighted average price of the PPAs executed pursuant 
to the Amended RFP was approximately 40 percent lower than the weighted average price of 
the PPAs under the Initial RFP.31 
The Attorney General’s witnesses—the Brattle Group’s Judy Chang and Jurgen Weiss—
conducted a rigorous assessment of NSTAR’s bid evaluation.  They concluded that NSTAR 
reasonably exercised discretion consistent with the framework set forth in the Amended RFP 
and confirmed NSTAR’s scoring of the bids.  DOER agreed with that overall conclusion.  In briefs, 
no party opposed Department approval of the PPAs. 
 
                                                          
30 While there was no opposition to the PPAs themselves, there were some issues raised with respect to the cost recovery mechanisms. 
31 Testimony of James J. Daly, Exhibit JGD-1, p. 23, D.P.U. 11-05. 
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WMECO 
After conducting its price and non-price second stage evaluation in accordance with the bid 
evaluation protocol developed by the Distribution Companies and DOER, WMECO selected the 
top seven highest scoring projects for its short list, but focused on the three highest ranking 
projects.32  WMECO selected the Noble Passadumkeag proposal as its preferred project—a 
proposed sale of energy, RECs and capacity (capacity would be transacted through a financial 
swap) from a planned 37.5 MW wind project located in Maine with an estimated annual output 
of 115,085 MWh.33  The estimated annual output represented slightly more than three percent 
of WMECO’s annual distribution load, which was the upper end of WMECO’s procurement 
target, as reflected in the Amended RFP.34 
In its initial bid, the Noble proposal ranked second, although it was the most attractively priced 
project.  The top-ranked project, when considered alone, was too small to meet WMECO’s 
procurement target.  WMECO decided that Noble’s proposal was “the best match” “based on 
several factors, including the cost effectiveness of the bid, the size of the project, and the extent 
to which a Power Purchase Agreement would facilitate the financing of renewable energy 
generation.”35 
WMECO sought and obtained a price reduction from Noble.36  After obtaining the refreshed bid 
from Noble, the Noble proposal was both the top-ranked project as well as the most 
attractively-priced proposal.37   
The Attorney General’s witnesses testified that WMECO’s process for bid evaluation and 
selection was a reasonable exercise of discretion pursuant to the framework set forth in the 
Amended RFP.   
 
                                                          
32 Testimony of Timothy J. Honan at p. 16, WMECO’s Response to IR AG-3-008(a). 
33 Testimony of Timothy J. Honan at p. 16. 
34 See Amended RFP Section 1.1, n. 1 (WMECO Response to IR AG-1-008 at p. 5, n.1).  The nominal target was 1.5 percent of annual distribution 
load.  Amended RFP Section 1.1. 
35 WMECO Respose to IR-AG-3-008(a).  In fact, the top-ranked project was an existing project and the bidder’s proposal stated that a long-term 
contract was not needed to facilitate financing. 
36 WMECO Response to IR-AG-3-008(c). 
37 Testimony of Timothy J. Honan at p. 16. 
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Unitil 
Pursuant to the RFP process, Unitil signed a 15-year contract with Black Bear Hydro Partners, 
LLC (“Black Bear” or “BBHP”), an indirect subsidiary of ArcLight Energy Partners Fund II, L.P. 
(“ArcLight”) for RECs from its planned 2.2 MW expansion of the Stillwater B hydroelectric 
project in Old Town, Maine.  The projected annual output from the project is 18,299 MWh, 
which represented 3.8% of the Unitil’s distribution load, which is somewhat larger than the 3.0% 
percent minimum purchase requirement under Section 83 of the GCA. 
After the second stage of the evaluation process, Unitil selected the top ten ranked bids for 
further evaluation.  In the third stage evaluation, applying the criteria set forth in the Amended 
RFP, Unitil selected three bidders for its short list.  The Stillwater B project was one of the top-
ranked projects, was a planned generating facility expansion while several others were simply 
existing facilities.  Moreover, the size of the Stillwater B contract was in line with Unitil’s 
procurement target, while many others were considerably larger.  Unitil sought a price 
reduction from several bidders, but only received a price reduction from Black Bear for the 
Stillwater B project.  Unitil decided to negotiate a contract with Black Bear.   
The Attorney General’s expert witnesses submitted testimony in which they concluded that 
Unitil’s evaluation process, short listing and selection of Black Bear was a reasonable exercise of 
discretion pursuant to the Amended RFP.  DOER’s review disclosed that Unitil used its own 
methodology for the price evaluation, rather than the methodology developed by the 
Distribution Companies and DOER, but it did not make a difference in the result.  Unitil and 
DOER sought approval of the PPA, and the Attorney General did not oppose it.38  
5. The Department’s Decisions on the NSTAR, WMECO and Unitil PPAs 
In a decision issued on August 19, 2011, the Department found that that NSTAR’s proposed 
contracts satisfied the applicable requirements of Section 83 of the GCA, including cost-
effectiveness, contribution to employment, commercial operation date, RPS qualification, 
enhanced reliability, moderation of system peak loads, and that the long-term contracts would 
facilitate financing of the proposed projects.39  The Department also found that the proposed 
                                                          
38 DOER proposed that Unitil be directed to utilize the cost recovery mechanism approved in the NSTAR case for RECs to be purchased under 
the Stillwater B PPA, rather than charging basic service customers the difference between the contract rate and the market rate, as Unitil had 
proposed. 
39 NSTAR Electric Company, D.P.U. 11-05, 11-06, 11-07 (2011) at 16-38. 
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contracts were in the public interest, finding that “the Company selected the projects using a 
solicitation process that was open, fair, and transparent and, therefore competitive.”40   
While the Attorney General’s witnesses supported the reasonableness of the Distribution 
Companies’ evaluation and bid selection processes in the context of the Amended RFP, they 
also expressed some concerns and suggested possible future improvements.  The Department 
found that the current proceedings were not the appropriate forum to consider the 
recommendations, but encouraged DOER and the distribution companies to consult with the 
Attorney General with respect to the development of future RFPs.41  Following a similar 
analytic approach as in the NSTAR decision, the Department approved WMECO’s entry into a 
long-term contract with Noble Passadumkeag in an order issued on October 7, 2011,42  and 
Unitil’s contract with Black Bear in an order issued  on December 7, 2011.43  
D. Cape Wind 
On December 3, 2009, National Grid sought approval from the DPU to negotiate a long-term 
PPA with Cape Wind.  Later that month, the Department approved National Grid’s proposed 
                                                          
40 NSTAR Electric Company, (August 19, 2011) at 48.  The Department also approved NSTAR’s revised proposal on cost recovery under which 
NSTAR would resell energy into the market and retain RECs for basic service, charging its basic service customers the spot price for RECs.  
Distribution customers would pay, or receive a credit for, the difference between the contract price and the market price for energy and 
RECs. 
 
41
 Id at 52-53.   The issues raised by the Attorney General and recommended changes are addressed along with some other issues pertaining 
to the Section 83 procurements and suggestions for improvements in Section IV.E of this report. 
 
42 Western Massachusetts Electric Company, D.P.U. 11-12 (October 7, 2011).  The Department also approved WMECO’s proposed cost recovery 
mechanism under which energy and RECs would be sold into the market, with distribution customers paying (or receiving a credit for) the net 
difference, with the financial settlement on the capacity price under the PPA being treated in a similar fashion.  Id. at 47-49. 
 
43 Fitchburg Gas and Electric Company, d/b//a Unitil, D.P.U. 11-30, at 35-36 (December 11, 2011).  While Unitil had proposed to use the 
purchased RECs for its basic service services and to charge them the Black Bear PPA contract price, the Department ordered that the 
mechanism adopted in the NSTAR case be applied—that is, basic service would be charged the market price for RECs and the distribution 
customers, who would be paying the 4% remuneration to Unitil, would obtain the benefit and detriment of the REC contract price relative to 
REC market prices.  Id. at 41-44. 
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timetable and method of solicitation and potential execution of a long-term contract with Cape 
Wind as consistent with the requirements of Section 83.44 
Following several months of negotiations, National Grid and Cape Wind negotiated a PPA and 
submitted it to the DPU for approval.  During the course of the lengthy proceedings, the PPA 
was amended pursuant to a settlement agreement with National Grid, the Attorney General, 
Cape Wind, and DOER.   In November 2010, the Department approved the amended PPA.45 
Cape Wind is a wind energy facility of up to 468 MW to be located offshore of Massachusetts in 
the federal waters of Nantucket Sound.  National Grid agreed to purchase 50 percent of the 
energy, capacity, and RECs associated with the project for $187 per MWh (2013 base year) for 
15 years, escalating at 3.5 percent per year.  There are provisions for upward price adjustments 
under some circumstances and for downward price adjustments in other circumstances, as well 
as purchase quantity adjustments if Cape Wind revises the nameplate capacity of the facility.  
National Grid also has an option to extend the PPA for an additional 10 years. 
The Department found that the PPA would assist Cape Wind in securing financing, satisfying a 
requirement that the PPA “facilitate the financing” of the project.   
The Department recognized that the power products to be purchased under the PPA are 
expensive, and that there are other opportunities to purchase renewable energy at lower 
cost.46  However, the Department found that “the Cape Wind facility offers significant benefits 
that are not currently available from any other renewable resources” and that “these benefits 
outweigh the costs of the project.”47 
The Department compared the expected costs of the PPA to the market value of the products 
purchased by National Grid and the value of the electric energy market price suppression 
benefits to National Grid customers.  While this produced net costs, the Department found that 
the PPA was cost-effective because they were outweighed by un-quantified benefits.  These 
benefits included the positive impact of certain contract provisions that could reduce costs to 
                                                          
44 Massachusetts Electric Company and Nantucket Electric Company, each d/b/a National Grid, D.P.U. 09-138 (December 29, 2009). 
45 Massachusetts Electric Company and Nantucket Electric Company, each d/b/a National Grid, D.P.U. 10-54 (November 22, 2010). 
 
46 Id. Executive Summary, p. xvii. 
47 Id. 
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ratepayers, the role that such a large project could play in achieving compliance with 
Massachusetts RPS requirements, the avoidance of very substantial compliance costs under the 
Massachusetts Global Warming Solutions Act, G.L. c. 21N,  employment benefits, and having 
especially favorable characteristics due to its location and production profile resulting in 
enhanced electric system reliability and moderation of system peak load.48   Finally, the 
Department found that the PPA was in the public interest due to the unique benefits of Cape 
Wind, including its size, location on the regional transmission system and the absence of 
transmission constraints, making it attractive relative to other renewable energy projects, the 
reasonableness of pricing for an offshore wind project, and the reasonableness of the contract 
size for National Grid.49 
With regard to cost recovery, the DPU approved National Grid’s proposal to use the energy, 
capacity and RECs purchased from Cape Wind for their basic service customers, but to charge 
the basic service customers a market price for these products.  Distribution customers would be 
charged (or obtain a credit for) the difference between the contract price and market price for 
energy, RECs and capacity and would be charged 4 percent of the PPA payments as 
remuneration for National Grid. 
Four parties, the Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound (“APNS”), AIM, NEPGA, and TransCanada, 
filed an appeal.  The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld the Department’s order 
approving the Cape Wind PPA.50  Against a challenge that the PPA was the result of an 
unconstitional exclusion of out-of-state projects, the Court upheld the Department’s finding 
that National Grid’s decision to enter into the Cape Wind PPA was without regard to the 
geographic limitations in Section 83, which the Department had subsequently removed for 
Section 83 solicitations following the TransCanada lawsuit.  The Court also upheld the DPU’s 
interpretation of, and findings regarding, the “cost-effectiveness” of the Cape Wind PPA, the 
satisfaction of the “public interest” standard, and the Department’s authority under Section 83 
to authorize an individual negotiation.  Finally, the Court upheld the Department’s authority to 
treat “facilitation of financing,” referenced as a purpose of Section 83, as a requirement.51   
                                                          
48 Id. at 208-215. 
49 Id. at 283-84. 
50 Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound v. Department of Public Utilities, 461 Mass. 166 (December 28, 2011). 
51 In a companion case, the Supreme Judicial Court also denied APNS’s appeal regarding its request to the DPU to reopen the record to 
introduce new evidence.  Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound v. Department of Public Utilities, 461 Mass. 190 (December 28, 2011). 
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E. Current Status of Projects 
Each of the three wind projects for which NSTAR signed PPAs are in commercial operation or in 
an advanced state of construction.  In early December 2012, Governor Patrick and other state 
officials celebrated the 28.5 MW Hoosac wind farm in Florida and Monroe, Massachusetts as 
the construction project neared completion.52  Iberdrola’s other project, the 48.0 MW Groton 
wind farm in Groton, New Hampshire, is also in an advanced state of construction with an 
expected completion date by the end of December 2012. 53  First Wind’s 34.0 MW Bull Hill wind 
project in Hancock County, Maine achieved commercial operation on October 31, 2012.54 
BBHP’s 2.2 MW Stillwater B hydroelectric expansion project, which is under a 15-year REC-only 
contract with Unitil, recently obtained a necessary license amendment from the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission55 and is now in construction. 
In November 2012, the Maine Department of Environment Protection denied Passadumkeag 
Wind Park LLC’s application for a permit, citing adverse visual impacts on a nearby scenic lake.56  
While the project developer, which has a PPA with WMECO for the 37.5 MW project, has the 
right to appeal the decision, the future prognosis is uncertain, at best. 
All in all, the success rate from the Amended RFP so far is 80% of the projects and 74% of the 
generating capacity.   
Last month, NSTAR received approval from the DPU for the PPA it had executed with Cape 
Wind earlier this year.57   The PPA, which is for 27.5 percent of the project’s energy, capacity 
and RECs, is very similar to the PPA Cape Wind signed with National Grid.  Cape Wind’s financial 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
52 http://www.mass.gov/governor/pressoffice/pressreleases/2012/20121203-hoosac-wind-power-project-celebrated.html.  
53 http://www.concordmonitor.com/article/356769/windmills-rise-along-with-hopes.  
54 http://www.firstwind.com/projects/bull-hill.  
55 Black Bear Hydro Partners, LLC, Order Amending License and Revising Annual Charges, 140 FERC ¶62,195 (September 14, 2012). 
56 http://bangordailynews.com/2012/11/09/news/penobscot/maine-dep-rejects-passadumkeag-wind-project/.  
57 NSTAR Electric Company, D.P.U. 12-30 (November 26, 2012). 
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advisor has stated that the two long-term contracts provide a “critical mass” as Cape Wind 
continues efforts to secure financing.58  
 
F. Section 83A and Its Significance for the Review of the Section 83 Solicitation 
Process 
Section 83A is similar to Section 83, but with a number of modifications.  We summarize them 
in the table below because future solicitations under Section 83A will be different from the 
solicitations conducted under Section 83.  This is relevant to our assessment, and stakeholder 
views, regarding the Section 83 solicitations and ways to improve future solicitations.  
    Matter Addressed 
 
Section 83 
 
Section 83A 
Time frame Sunsets on December 31, 2012 
(Section 36 of Chapter 209) 
January 1, 2013- 
December 31, 2016  
Allowable Solicitations Competitive bidding or  
individual negotiations 
Competitive bidding only 
Number of solicitations/% of 
load 
2 solicitations for 3% of load 2 solicitations for 4% of load 
(3.6% after set-aside for small 
non-solar renewable distributed 
generation, which will have 
separate RFPs) 
Term of PPAs 10 to 15 years 10 to 20 years 
Solicitation approach -DPU rules: Distribution 
Companies to consider “DOER-
administered solicitations” 
-Amended RFP: Distribution 
Companies evaluate bids,  short 
list bids, and negotiate bids 
separately without consulting 
each other or DOER 
-Solicitations to be conducted 
jointly by Distribution 
Companies and coordinated by 
DOER, unless the DPU rules that 
an individual company 
solicitation would be more cost 
effective to ratepayers 
-Distribution Companies shall 
enter into a contract with the 
                                                          
58 http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/2012/11/26/state-approves-cape-wind-deal-with-
nstar/6sygW0D6QrJVs15xTxl9EO/story.html.  
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winning bidders for their share 
of the products purchased 
(based on relative sizes of their 
distribution loads) 
Distribution Company 
consultation requirement 
DOER DOER and the Attorney General 
Remuneration to Distribution 
Companies 
4% of annual payments 2.75% of annual payments 
Project commercial operation 
date 
On or after January 1, 2008 On or after January 1, 2013 
Statutory criteria (differences 
only)59 
Following TransCanada lawsuit: 
“Where feasible, create 
additional employment” 
“Where feasible, create 
additional employment and 
economic development in the 
commonwealth” 
Thus, the one-on-one negotiation process that National Grid pursued with Cape Wind would 
not be permissible under Section 83A, which mandates a competitive bidding process.  As 
another example, individual Distribution Company bid evaluation, bid selection and contract 
negotiations without any coordination with other Distribution Companies or DOER, is much less 
likely to occur under Section 83A. 
In the next section, we provide our assessment of the relationship between long-term contracts 
under Section 83 and financing renewable energy projects. 
 
 
 
                                                          
59  In addition, Section 83A has a provision with no counterpart in Section 83.   If there are significant transmission 
costs included in a bid, Section 83A directs the DPU to “authorize the contracting parties to seek recovery of such 
transmission costs of the project through federal transmission rates, consistent with policies and tariffs of the 
federal energy regulatory commission, to the extent the department finds such recovery is in the public interest.”  
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III. Assessment: Has the Long-Term Contracting Mandate Reasonably 
Supported the Commonwealth’s Renewable Energy Goals? 
 
A. Introduction  
In order to assess the extent to which the long-term contracting requirements of Section 83 
reasonably support the renewable energy goals of the Commonwealth, we address the need 
for long-term contracts to support Massachusetts’ RPS goals and the manner in which long-
term contracts aid in the financing of construction of renewable energy projects.  This section 
then addresses the resulting benefits. 
 
B. The Role of Long-Term Contracts Under Section 83 in Facilitating Financing of New 
Renewable Generation 
1. Without Contracts, Renewable Energy Revenue Sources are Subject to Considerable 
Volatility  
Long-term contracts provide renewable energy developers with an opportunity to obtain a 
predictable amount of revenue assuming that their plants will perform as projected.  An 
understanding of the components and characteristics of the types of revenue on which 
renewable energy developers and their investors rely is important in understanding the role of 
long-term power contracts in financing construction of renewable energy projects.  
Class I renewable generation projects provide two types of marketable products—energy and 
RECs—and many provide capacity.60  Of the six PPAs executed by the Distribution Companies 
and approved by the DPU in 2010-2011, three PPAs involved the purchase of energy, RECs, and 
capacity (three wind projects), two PPAs were for energy and RECs (two wind projects), and one 
PPA was only for RECs (an expansion of an existing hydro project).  As an intermittent resource, 
wind energy projects can provide only a limited amount of capacity to ISO-New England.  
Hence, the bulk of the market revenues on which wind energy developers rely to pay for their 
revenue requirements are from the sale of electric energy and RECs.   Revenue requirements 
                                                          
60 Energy is the amount in megawatthours (MWh) that a generating plant produces.  Capacity is a measure of capability to produce MWhs and 
is measured in megawatts (MW) or in kilowatts (kW, which is .001 MW). 
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are the funds needed to pay for construction of the power plant and associated development 
costs, the operation and maintenance of the project, and a return on the capital investment in 
the project sufficient to attract the required investment from investors.   
Over time, there has been considerable volatility in the market for energy and RECs.  Electric 
energy prices in New England have moved up and down with market prices for natural gas in 
light of the large role that natural gas-fired generators play in the New England electricity 
markets.  Unlike the case of natural gas generators, there is no correlation between the cost of 
production for renewable energy generators and the market value of energy.  Hence, 
renewable energy developers generally have a need to hedge their market price risk involving 
electric energy.  Below is a graph showing average monthly locational marginal energy prices in 
ISO-New England. 
 
 
 
The market for Massachusetts Class I RECs is much smaller than the market for electric energy 
and has experienced equal or more volatility.  Class 1 (formerly new) REC prices have increased 
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from approximately $27 in 2003 to approximately $50 in 2004-2008 near the ACP when supply 
was very tight relative to demand down to approximately $30 in 2009 to near $15 from July 
2010 to June 2011 back up to approximately $40 in early 2012 to $60+ in recent months (near 
the inflation-adjusted ACP).  These fluctuations in REC market prices are shown in the graph 
below. 61  
 
The market prices for energy and RECs are not well correlated to each other, including periods 
when both energy and REC prices are high, periods when they are both low, and periods when 
they are inversely related, as the following graph shows.  The combination of these two 
products does not substantially reduce the volatility or market price risk. 
                                                          
61 The graph was provided by Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. 
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REC market prices are driven by two key factors—(1) fundamental value if the market is in 
balance, and (2) value driven by supply and demand, especially if there are shortages or 
surpluses.  The fundamental value of a REC is often viewed as the difference between the 
marginal renewable generation unit’s revenue requirements (as may be adjusted to take into 
consideration federal tax benefits) minus the expected market value of the energy produced 
and any marketable capacity provided on a $/MWh basis.62   For Class I resources, the marginal 
renewable generating unit is an onshore wind energy project since this is the least costly form 
of Class I renewable generation that can be produced in quantity. 
While one would expect that based on the long-term fundamental value approach, REC prices 
would be inversely related to energy prices (i.e., when energy prices rise, REC prices would 
decline and vice-versa), in practice, REC prices move up and down (sometimes, quite sharply) 
based on short-term supply and demand.    Some of the reasons for this variability are: 
 the RPS markets are much smaller in terms of MWh (and total dollar value) than the 
energy markets; 
 demand is set primarily by RPS statutes and regulations in the region; and  
                                                          
62 The marginal renewable generating unit is a hypothetical RPS-qualified generating unit with costs of production where the supply curve and 
demand curve meet.  (This is not the same as the marginal generator in the ISO-NE energy market.)  The demand curve is based on the 
expected RPS requirements in the particular region under study. 
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 developing, financing and building new renewable generation usually takes years to 
accomplish with the need to overcome considerable hurdles.   
Hence, there is a tendency for shortages to develop with REC prices reaching the upper limit of 
allowable REC prices, as is currently the case.  On the other hand, surpluses may develop, 
driving REC prices sharply downward, as was the case in late 2010 and early 2011, and could 
possibly drive REC prices into the single-digit range.   
Moreover, RECs, unlike electric energy, are not a natural commodity—they are the product of 
state legislatures and administrative agencies.  There is the concern--especially if REC prices are 
in the upper range of allowable prices for a sustained basis--that the RPS law or regulations 
might be modified to reduce RPS demand or increase RPS eligibility, thus reducing REC prices, 
or the RPS itself might be eliminated.  Also, a particular kind of renewable resource might lose 
favor and either be “delisted” or be subject to new compliance requirements.  Hence, with RECs 
there is a relatively high perceived “regulatory risk” or risk that a “change in law” could affect 
revenue through changes in REC market prices and/or RPS qualification for generating units in 
the future.  The perception of the degree of this type of risk may also vary based on the 
particular type of renewable generation.   
Another element to the mix, whether viewed as a revenue source or as an offset to revenue 
requirements, is federal tax credits or related benefits for renewable energy projects.  Since 
originally enacted by the Energy Policy Act of 1992, there has been a federal production tax 
credit (“PTC”) for wind energy projects and other specified renewable energy projects that go 
into service before a defined in-service deadline.63  The PTC is $22/MWh for wind energy in 
2012 ($11/MWh for hydro), has an annual inflation-adjustment, and has a term of 10 years 
following the in-service date.  The PTC has been extended every few years over the past two 
decades.  The current in-service deadline for wind projects is December 31, 2012 (December 
31, 2013 for hydro). 
The current version of the PTC was enacted as part of the American Recovery and Investment 
Act of 2009.  This legislation extended the then-existing in-service deadline and allowed 
facilities that qualify for the PTC to opt instead to take the federal business energy investment 
tax credit (“ITC”) or an equivalent cash grant from the U.S. Department of Treasury.64  The ITC 
                                                          
63 26 U.S.C. §45. 
64 See 26 U.S.C. § 48(a)(5)(C)(i).  Section  1603 of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, as amended by Section 707 of the Tax Relief, 
Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 provides for the U.S. Treasury Department to make payments to 
wind developers in lieu of the ITC for plants placed in service in 2012 and which meet other applicable requirements. 
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for PTC-eligible technologies is generally equal to 30% of eligible costs.  Both the ITC and the 
cash grant are subject to similar in-service deadlines as the PTC.65   
While Congress has extended the PTC many times before, there is substantial uncertainty in the 
current political climate as to whether the PTC will be extended, for how long, in what form, 
and in what amount.  The prospect for continuation of the ITC for PTC-eligible projects and the 
Treasury cash grant in lieu of the ITC is considered less likely.  For solar facilities, on the other 
hand, the in-service deadline for the investment tax credit of 30% of the qualifying investment 
is in place through December 2016.66  
These tax benefits (or cash payments in lieu of the ITC) have the effect of lowering the revenue 
needs of renewable energy developers.  Hence, to the extent these tax benefits are 
discontinued or reduced, revenue requirements will increase, which will likely result in 
increases in market REC prices (at least in the long run) and prices to be paid to renewable 
energy developers under long-term contracts.  By requiring project developers to rely more on 
REC revenues, the discontinuance or reduction of federal tax benefits will enhance their need 
for long-term contracts to manage both the market price risk and political risk associated with 
RECs. 
In conclusion, the outlook for renewable energy developers includes very high levels of 
volatility with respect to future market values of wholesale electric energy and REC prices and 
considerable uncertainty with respect to future federal tax benefits and renewable energy 
policies. 
2. Renewable Energy Developers and Investors Require Long-Term Contracts to Finance 
New Grid-Scale Projects 
In this context, developers of, and investors in, new renewable generation projects require 
long-term contracts before they will finance and built new grid-scale power plants.  In the past 
seven or eight years, the only such renewable generation project to be built primarily on a 
merchant basis (i.e., without long-term contracts) was TransCanada’s 132 MW Kibby Project in 
Maine,67 and our stakeholder interview results indicate that it is unlikely that such a decision 
                                                          
65 The structure of the cash grant deadlines, however, varies from those applicable to the PTC and ITC. 
66 26 U.S.C. § 48 
67 TransCanada did enter into a 10-year agreement with NSTAR in2007 to sell energy and RECs from 30 MW of the Kibby facility or 
approximately 23% of the energy and RECs produced by Kibby.  NSTAR entered into this arrangement as part of the NSTAR Green Program.  
See NSTAR Electric Company, D.P.U. 07-64-A (2008).  
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would be replicable in the future.  The bulk of renewable energy developers use project 
financing to raise debt and/or tax equity (equity investment primarily oriented to utilizing the 
PTC or ITC).  Lenders and tax equity providers generally require long-term contracts with 
creditworthy buyers as a condition to making project investments.  
There are also several large renewable energy developers that finance projects with internal 
funds and/or raise funds on the strength of their own company credit—known as balance sheet 
financing.  However, company managements also generally require that there be revenue 
certainty for energy and RECs before they will commit to financing construction of the projects.   
All 11 of the renewable energy developers interviewed for this study stated that long-term 
contracts for energy and RECs with creditworthy buyers are critical to their ability to finance 
and build new renewable energy projects.68   This included representatives of three renewable 
energy developers which employ or have employed balance sheet financing.  Their companies’ 
policy is to require long-term contracts as a prerequisite for management to commit funding for 
project construction. 
The interviews conducted confirmed that renewable energy developers will not build large 
multi-MW (non-net metered) Class I renewable energy projects without long-term contracts on 
a scale that will allow renewable energy generation to keep up with RPS demand.  This is true 
regardless of the type of developer or the way they finance their projects.  With respect to 
project-financed projects, the lender and tax equity investor interviewed expressed similar 
opinions with respect to the importance of long-term contracts to their decisions whether to 
invest in renewable energy projects. 
Furthermore, a number of the renewable generation developers stated that the opportunity to 
bid in forthcoming RFPs–in order to access the contracts they need—is important in their 
decisions whether to continue project development efforts (such as permitting) in this region. 
3.  Long-Term Contracts are Not Sufficiently Available in the Absence of Section 83 
There is a need for the Distribution Companies to enter into long-term contracts under Section 83 
because of a lack of availability in the market of other buyers willing and able to enter into long-term 
contracts with renewable energy developers.  With restructuring and retail electric service 
                                                          
68 One developer representative stated that the availability of long-term contracts provided a disincentive to build wind projects on a merchant 
basis and long-term contracts may distort the market.  On the other hand, he thought his management would require long-term contracts in 
order to hedge market price risks before building any new wind projects.    
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competition, the ability and willingness of load serving entities (“LSEs” a/k/a retail electric 
suppliers) to enter into long-term contracts to support new renewable generation has been 
extremely limited.  This is unsurprising since they enter into contracts to provide retail electric 
service with terms ranging from several months to up to three years or so.  Since they have 
little certainty regarding the amount of their loads or the pricing of RECs going out more than 
three years, they are very reluctant to enter into contracts beyond that period.  If they were to 
consider such contracting, purchase prices would be sharply discounted, making the economics 
for developers very difficult or infeasible.  Developers report the same is true for power 
marketers or energy trading firms that are not LSEs.  Municipal utilities have been purchasers of 
energy and RECs under long-term contracts, but their needs, willingness and capacity to 
purchase are relatively small relative to the RPS requirements.69  Other states in the region 
have long-term contracting programs, but they are focused on meeting the RPS needs of their 
states.70 
4. The DPU Has Recognized the Need for Long-Term Contracts 
The DPU addressed the questions of the need for long-term contracts to support financing of 
the renewable energy projects for which the Distribution Companies had signed PPAs.  In each 
case, the DPU found that the PPAs would facilitate financing of the proposed projects.  The 
DPU’s findings on the importance on long-term PPAs to financing renewable energy projects 
were based on evidence submitted by the Distribution Companies, which was primarily 
obtained from the project developers, and was largely uncontested. 
With regard to the PPA between National Grid and Cape Wind, the Department stated: 
The evidence demonstrates that a project like Cape Wind would face difficulty in 
attracting financing without a predictable source of revenues with a creditworthy entity.  
The predictable revenue stream of a long-term contract will help overcome obstacles to 
                                                          
69 In Massachusetts, municipal utilities are not subject to the RPS requirements. 
70 In 2009, the Rhode Island Legislature enacted the Long-Term Contracting Standard for Renewable Energy, which requires National Grid to 
acquire under long-term contract renewable energy resources equivalent to 90 MW multiplied by a 100% capacity factor. R.I. Gen. Laws § 
39—26.1 et seq.  The Maine Public Utilities Commission periodically issues RFPs for long-term contracts for renewable energy resources  
pursuant to Title 35-A M.R.S.A. § 3210-C , which authorizes the Commission to direct investor-owned transmission and distribution utilities to 
enter long-term contracts for capacity resources and associated energy.  Connecticut currently has a long-term contracting mandate but for 
certain renewable energy projects no larger than 2 MW.  See http://www.cl-
p.com/Home/SaveEnergy/GoingGreen/Renewable_Energy_Credits.   In November 2012, the New England Stages Committee on Electricity 
(“NESCOE”) issued a work plan for coordinated renewable power procurement among the New England states pursuant to a July 2012 New 
England Governors’ Resolution directing NESCO to implement such a work plan, with a goal of issuing a solicitation by December 2013.  
http://www.nescoe.com/uploads/WORK_PLAN_Final_Nov_2012.pdf .  This process is still in a state of development.   
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Cape Wind obtaining financing.  Ultimately, National Grid relied upon the 
representations of Cape Wind, the sole entity that has been in contact with the 
financing community about the Cape Wind project, that the terms of PPA-[1], will be 
sufficient for Cape Wind to obtain financing. 
Similarly, Cape Wind provided evidence that PPA-1 will facilitate the financing of its 
project.  Cape Wind testified that long-term contracts are critical to enhancing the 
likelihood of obtaining financing because such contracts identify the buyer of the output 
and provide for a revenue stream.  Although Cape Wind acknowledges that, historically, 
projects were developed and financed without a long-term contract in place, it has been 
five to ten years since that was the industry norm for the development of energy 
projects.  Cape Wind also testified that, in the current capital markets, it is unlikely that 
a renewable or even a non-renewable energy project will be developed without a long-
term contract for a major share of the output.  As such Cape Wind testified that long-
term contracts are necessary to secure financing for the Cape Wind project.  No party 
refuted the testimony of National Grid and Cape Wind that long-term contracts help the 
developers of renewable energy generation projects obtain financing, and we find such 
testimony credible and reliable.71 
With regard to the NSTAR PPA with Blue Sky East, LLC and the Bull Hill project, NSTAR showed 
that the proposed 15-year PPA would permit the project owner “to provide 20 to 40 percent 
project equity and raise capital by issuing long-term debt at attractive financing terms,” and 
without a long-term contract Blue Sky East, LLC “may obtain less favorable financing terms for 
Bull Hill or no financing at all.”72  The Department also found that the predictable revenue 
stream of a long-term contract was required to allow Iberdrola, which uses balance sheet 
financing, to commit its internal funds to constructing the Groton Wind and Hoosac Wind 
projects.73 
Similarly, with regard to the proposed Passadumkeag wind project, the Department found that 
based on information provided by the developer, WMECO demonstrated that “a predictable 
source of revenue with a creditworthy entity like an electric distribution company will assist 
                                                          
71 Id. at 51-52.  With respect to this and other Department decisions on facilitation of financing, footnotes, as well as references to testimony 
and exhibits, are omitted for ease of reading. 
72 NSTAR Electric Company, D.P.U. 11-05, at 20. 
73 Id. 
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Noble Wind in financing the wind facility and that, without such a long-term contract, obtaining 
such financing would be very difficult.”74 
Unitil entered into a 15-year REC-only PPA with BBHP, a developer that proposed to expand the 
generating capacity of an existing hydroelectric facility by 2 MW.  The Department found that 
the PPA will facilitate the financing of the expansion facility based on the positive role the PPA 
would have on BBHP to obtain debt financing on suitable terms. 
BBHP maintains that without an executed contract for a facility’s output, it is difficult for 
a developer to secure lender financing under current market conditions.  Specifically, 
BBHP maintains that lenders assign little value to the revenue stream associated with 
RECs, despite forward market projections.  Without a contract with a creditworthy 
counterparty for the output of the facility, BBHP states that those lenders that do offer 
financing often require restrictive terms such as higher interest rates and debt service 
coverage ratios, that are unacceptable to a borrower.75 
The Department requires a showing of the role of a long-term PPA in terms of the developer’s 
willingness and ability to finance a proposed project under Section 83.  The Department’s 
decisions to date demonstrate the importance of long-term contracts to financing new 
renewable energy projects.  
5. The Results of the Solicitations Show the Value of Long-Term Contracts 
Importantly, four projects arising out of the Section 83 process have been built or are in 
construction, with three wind plants likely to be completed by year’s end. The owners of those 
projects have confirmed that the Section 83 PPAs were critical in terms of their ability to 
finance and build those projects—regardless of whether they have utilized project finance (2 
projects) or balance sheet financing (2 projects).  For Iberdrola, which uses balance sheet 
financing, the PPAs were critically important in terms of corporate management’s decision to 
make the capital investment in constructing the projects.  For the other two projects, the PPAs 
allowed the project owners to obtain debt on a project-financed basis.  The two other 
developers with PPAs have expressed that the PPAs provide them with the capability to obtain 
project financing—in industry parlance, the PPAs are “financeable.” 
                                                          
74 Western Massachusetts Electric Company, D.P.U. 11-12 (2011) at 14-15. 
75 Fitchburg Gas and Electric Company d/b/a Unitil, D.P.U. 11-30 (2011) at 14. 
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6. Energy Stakeholders Stated the Importance of Long-Term Contracts 
In addition to the renewable energy developers and investors iinterviewed for this report, the other 
energy stakeholders interviewed stated their understanding that long-term contracts are important to 
the financing and construction of new utility-scale renewable energy projects.  This included all of the 
Distribution Companies and each of the organizational stakeholders, although the organizational 
stakeholders had disagreements or concerns regarding various aspects of the way Section 83 was 
implemented.76   
C. Impacts of Long-Term Contracts 
Without a long-term contracting mandate, such as Section 83 or Section 83A, it is highly likely 
that Class I renewable energy supply will not keep up with the Commonwealth’s RPS goals, with 
their annual increase in demand.  According to Robert C. Grace, President of Sustainable Energy 
Advantage, LLC and a leading renewable energy regional market analyst, the RECs produced by 
the projects with Section 83 PPAs should produce enough RECs over the next two years to bring 
REC supply in line with Massachusetts Class I RPS demand, which should have the effect of 
reducing REC market prices from their current high levels.  However, with the continuing 
increase in RPS demand, additional PPAs will need to be executed under the new Section 83A in 
order to keep RPS supply and demand in balance for the next several succeeding years.77  A 
graph showing historical RPS supply and demand through 2010 and projected RPS demand 
through 2016 is shown below. 
 
                                                          
76 Issues pertaining to the reasonableness of the implementation of Section 83 are addressed in Section IV of this report. 
77 The extent to which REC prices will be constrained through the addition of new renewable generation will depend on the extent to which 
supply will catch up with demand.    
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Without the construction of new renewable energy projects, there will be a shortage of Class I 
RECs to meet the increasing annual demand for Class I RECs, resulting in the inability to meet 
the Commonwealth’s renewable energy goals embodied in the RPS.  If supply fails to keep pace 
with demand, market REC prices will gravitate toward the Alternative Compliance Price, which 
each year will increase with the rate of inflation, resulting in higher rates to Massachusetts 
ratepayers.  The contracts executed under Section 83, to the extent the associated projects are 
built, will result in the creation of new RECs to be produced each year, contributing to meeting 
the RPS goals.   If supply keeps up with demand, the new PPAs and projects should have a 
dampening effect on REC market prices.  Of course, if there is a shortage, retail electric 
suppliers (a) will not be able to purchase a portion of their renewable energy requirements but 
will be required to pay the ACP instead and (b) will pay higher prices for their REC market 
purchases, which will probably be priced at a small discount to the ACP.  Failure to meet 
Massachusetts’ renewable energy goals will result in both higher greenhouse gas emissions and 
higher costs to Massachusetts ratepayers.  
A byproduct of the increase in renewable energy production brought about by long-term 
contracts is suppression of wholesale electric energy prices.  This occurs when zero cost or low 
cost energy generation is added to the markets, which has the effect of reducing wholesale 
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energy market clearing prices.78   While the magnitude and duration of this effect is subject to 
debate, the Department has recognized that wind energy and other renewable energy 
resources have a substantial energy price suppression effect.79  This is a benefit also recognized 
by many of the interviewees questioned on this topic. 
The Section 83 PPAs will also lock in the cost of energy and RECs (and also capacity for several 
of the contracts) purchased under the PPAs.  The impacts, based on the cost recovery 
mechanisms approved by the Department, is that the Distribution Company’s basic service 
customers will benefit by having an assured quantity of RECs (subject to amounts produced by 
the projects) for 10 to 15 years while the larger group of distribution customers will receive a 
hedge with respect to the price of energy they purchase, including the price associated with 
RECs required to serve them by their retail electric suppliers. 
Under the plans of the Distribution Companies approved by the DPU, the Distribution 
Companies will resell energy purchased under the PPAs into the market.  Their distribution 
customers will pay the net charge or receive the net benefit based on the difference between 
the contract price and the market price.  The Distribution Companies will retain the RECs in 
order to serve their basic service customers, but they will charge their basic service customers 
the market price for the RECs.  The distribution customers will receive the benefit of, or incur 
the burden of, the difference between the PPA REC contract price and the market price paid by 
the basic service customers.  In this manner, the competitive balance between basic service and 
competitive retail electric service will be maintained, the Distribution Companies (and their 
distribution customers) avoid transaction charges associated with selling RECs into the market, 
and the net charge or credit for the RECs will be assigned to the distribution customers, who 
will also be responsible for paying the 4% remuneration to the Distribution Companies.80 
                                                          
78
 In ISO-New England, energy clearing prices are set by the bid submitted by the highest cost (or marginal) 
generator dispatched to meet demand.  Low variable cost generators typically submit bids below that of the 
marginal generators, tending to displace higher cost generation, resulting in a lower clearing price for electric 
energy.  While this effect is usually modest on a $/MWh basis, the impact is generally widespread, so the total 
effect can be quite substantial.    
79
 Massachusetts Electric Company and Nantucket Electric Company, each d/b/a National Grid, D.P.U. 10-54 (2010) 
at 108-131; NSTAR Electric Company, D.P.U. (November 26, 2012) at 70-78. 
80
 For example, assume that the PPA has a REC price of $35 and an energy price of $55/MWh and 100,000 MWh is 
produced in the course of a year.  The Distribution Company for the particular year buys RECs for its basic service 
customers at an average price of $60.  The 100,000 RECs produced by the Project are used by the Distribution 
Company to provide basic service.  However, the basic service customers are charged at the market rate--$60 per 
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The impact of the REC purchase is multifold.  Basic service customers benefit primarily because 
their need for purchasing RECs from the market is reduced, having a dampening effect on REC 
purchase prices.  For distribution customers, the long-term REC purchase serves as a hedge of 
their exposure to long-term REC prices (as well as energy prices).  If REC prices continue to stay 
high, as is currently the case, distribution customers will likely receive credits against their 
utility bills. 
 
IV. The Reasonableness and Effectiveness of the Section 83 Solicitations 
In this section, we address the manner in which the Section 83 requirements were 
implemented in the solicitation processes carried out in 2009-2011 following the passage of the 
Green Communities Act and the opportunities for improvements in future solicitations to be 
conducted under Section 83A.  Since Section 83A mandates competitive bidding processes in 
the future, our focus will be on the review of the RFP process under Section 83 and to a lesser 
extent on the negotiation process which led to the PPAs with Cape Wind.   We address the 
following issues in turn: 
 The robustness of the response and the adequacy of outreach to prospective bidders; 
 Eligibility issues and fairness of the process; 
 The extent to which the selected projects selected satisfied statutory and regulatory 
objectives and requirements;  
 Viability of the projects receiving contracts; 
 The reasonableness of the bid evaluation and selection process; 
 The effectiveness and efficiency of utilizing a DOER-coordinated solicitation process 
 Fairness of the Model PPA and its use.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
REC.  The difference--$25 per REC for 100,000 RECs or $2.5 million is allocated to the distribution customers as a 
credit to their bill.  However, the energy purchased from the wind project is sold into the market at an average 
price of $40/MWh, which results in a $1.5 million charge to distribution customers.  Finally, the Distribution 
Company receives 4% of its total payments as remuneration—which would be $90/MWh * 100,000 MWh * 4% or 
$360,000.  The net benefit to the Distribution Company’s distribution customers in this year would be $2,500,000 
(RECs) minus $1,500,000 (energy) minus $360,000 (remuneration) for a total of $640,000. 
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A. Robustness of the RFP Response and Adequacy of Outreach to Prospective Bidders  
The overall result of the RFP process was a very robust response from the renewable energy 
development community.  The three distribution companies that executed PPAs pursuant to 
the Amended RFP each received over 100 proposals from developers with respect to over 70 
renewable energy projects.  There was considerable overlap, as many developers submitted 
proposals to multiple distribution companies.  NSTAR reported that it received proposals from 
over 2,500 MW of renewable generation with an average annual output of 7.5 million 
MWh/year, representing more than 11 times the upper end of its procurement target (3% of 
distribution load).  The ratio of bid MWh to procurement target MWh was even higher for 
WMECO and Unitil.  
The Amended RFP was distributed to more than 300 individuals and renewable energy 
developers from a list compiled by the distribution companies and DOER.  This followed several 
earlier wide-scale distributions of RFP documents related to filings before the Department of 
the Initial RFP and Amended RFP and an earlier circulation of draft RFP documents for 
comment.  In addition, notice of the Amended RFP was sent to a variety of trade publications.   
The extensive response to the Amended RFP is evidence that there was a strong renewable 
energy industry demand for long-term contracts for energy and/or RECs, bidders generally must 
have felt that they had a reasonable opportunity to obtain a contract, and that the outreach 
activities of the Distribution Companies and DOER were very effective.  Another factor is that 
developers had the ability to submit the same proposal, with or without modifications, to 
multiple prospective buyers at the same time, which mitigated the time and cost associated 
with developing proposals compared to responding to multiple solicitations with different 
requirements at different times. 
 
B. Eligibility Issues and Fairness of the Process 
Following the TransCanada lawsuit, the Department removed the in-state geographic limitation 
on bidder eligibility and requested the Distribution Companies to submit a revised RFP.  Most 
interviewees had a favorable view on removal of the geographic limitation, which led to a very 
robust bidder response to the Amended RFP and very competitive pricing from experienced 
developers with viable projects.  
In the Amended RFP, the Distribution Companies, in coordination with DOER, solicited 
proposals from Class I Renewable Generation Units.  There were a number of bids from solar PV 
projects.  RECs from these projects were valued as Class I RECs.  
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Allco Renewable Energy Limited (“Allco”), a bidder of solar PV projects, filed complaints against 
NSTAR, WMECO and Unitil claiming, among other things, that the Distribution Companies were 
required to treat their bids as offers from Solar Carve-Out Renewable Generation Units and to 
value the renewable energy attributes as Solar Carve-out Renewable Energy Credits (“S-RECs”) 
under the Massachusetts RPS and DOER’s regulations, but failed to do so.  S-RECs have higher 
values than Class I RECs. The Distribution Companies and DOER opposed Allco’s complaint on a 
number of grounds.  The Department granted the Distribution Company’s motions to dismiss.81  
The Department found that (a) RPS Class I Renewable Generating Units under DOER’s 
regulations do not include Solar Carve-out Renewable Generation Units, (b) a new facility using 
solar PV may elect qualification as either a Class I Renewable Generation Unit or a Class I Solar 
Carve-out Renewable Generation Unit, but not both, (c) Allco’s proposals to bid S-RECs from 
Class I Solar Carve-out Renewable Generation Units were ineligible under the Amended RFP, 
and (d) the Distribution Companies were not required under Section 83 to consider proposals 
from Solar Carve-out Renewable Generation Units or to value S-RECs.82  
There are a number of programs in Massachusetts that have fostered solar PV development in 
the Commonwealth, including net metering for projects below specified kW thresholds, the RPS 
Solar Carve-out, the Solar Credit Clearinghouse Auction, and rebates from the Massachusetts 
Clean Energy Center.   
Representatives of the Solar Energy Industries Association (“SEIA”) have stated that a long-term 
contracting program for larger projects above the size eligible for net metering would help 
these projects to obtain financing and reduce costs to customers.  Solar PV projects tend to 
have higher costs than large grid-scale wind projects and are unlikely to be cost-competitive if 
they must compete as Class I units with eligibility to sell only Class I RECs.  The SEIA 
representatives suggested a SREC-only Section 83 solicitation or a Section 83 solicitation where 
the evaluation criteria are revised so that solar PV project would be more competitive or where 
diversity would be given more weight.  The Conservation Law Foundation also would like to see 
more emphasis on diversity and less emphasis on price, specifically a weighting less than 80 
percent.  Under the Amended RFP, diversity was a factor to be considered in the third stage of 
the evaluation process. 
National Grid decided to negotiate a PPA with Cape Wind, with the Department approving the 
process and the resulting PPA under Section 83.  Some parties, including DOER, the Attorney 
                                                          
81 Allco Renewable Energy Limited, D.P.U. 11-23, 11-24, 11-25 (October 19, 2011). 
82 Id. 
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General, and the Conservation Law Foundation, advocated for both the negotiation process and 
approval of the PPA based on the unique benefits of the Cape Wind project based on, among 
other things, the project’s size and location, energy price suppression benefits, greenhouse gas 
reduction benefits, and employment benefits.  Other parties, including AIM, NEPGA, ANPS, and 
several other interviewees objected to the non-competitive nature of the process and the high 
cost of the project’s energy, capacity, and RECs.  In our opinion, the individual negotiation 
process was appropriate under Section 83, especially given the unique characteristics of Cape 
Wind and its ability to contribute to RPS compliance, but will have little relevance for future 
solicitations under Section 83A, which mandates competitive bidding.  
Future solicitations under Section 83A are likely to resemble the Section 83 Amended RFP 
process in many respects.  The Amended RFP process was designed and executed in a manner 
that provided for equal access to prospective bidders of information and documents pertaining 
to the RFP.  The Distribution Companies and DOER developed a common website, 
www.massachusettsrenewableenergyrfp.com, which was utilized to post the Amended RFP, 
bidder response forms, the Model PPA, answers to questions from prospective bidders, and 
other pertinent material.  
Once bids were submitted, the Distribution companies were individually responsible for the 
evaluation and bid selection of proposals submitted to them.  Our review of the evaluation and 
bid selection process on an after-the-fact basis did not disclose any example of undue 
discrimination against, or undue preference for, any particular bidder, although there are some 
questions regarding the reasonableness of the bid evaluation and selection process, which are 
addressed in Section IV.E below.   There is one matter of particular concern regarding NSTAR’s 
administration of the RPF process, which pertained to the manner in which it used the Model 
PPA in its contract negotiations on one particular issue, which is addressed in Section IV.G 
below.  On the whole, however, there was a general consensus that the RFP process was 
designed and conducted in a manner that was fair to eligible bidders and was well run. 
  
C. The Extent to Which Statutory and Regulatory Objectives Were Achieved  
A solicitation process can reasonably be evaluated based on the extent to which the selected 
proposals satisfy the objectives of the procurement effort.  Based on Section 83 of the GCA and 
the Department’s applicable regulations, key objectives are cost-effectiveness and the extent to 
which the resulting contracts will facilitate financing of proposed projects. 
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In terms of cost-effectiveness, all of the proposals receiving contracts in the Amended RFP 
process were evaluated as being substantially below market over the contract term based on 
the common price forecast used in the economic evaluation.  This is indicative of the quality of 
the bids received, but is also reflective of the market price forecast itself.  In a competitive 
bidding context, the most important consideration is how the bids compared to each other in 
the economic evaluation and the process by which bids were solicited.83  The proposals that 
received contracts in the Amended RFP process reflected lower prices than originally bid due to 
requested price rebids sought by the Distribution Companies.  Also, the prices were either the 
lowest or among the lowest received.  Hence, the process worked well to obtain economically 
competitive contracts. 
In addition, each of the projects receiving contracts were new, to-be-constructed projects (or 
expansions of projects) and the developers made a showing that obtaining a long-term contract 
would facilitate financing of the proposed project.  This included a spectrum of project types 
(wind and hydro), product types (energy + RECs, energy + RECs+ capacity, and RECs only), and 
financing strategies (traditional project financing and balance sheet financing).  At the same 
time, all of the minimum statutory requirements were satisfied (contributions to reliability, 
employment additions, and moderation of system peak load). 
Hence, it is fair to conclude that the Amended RFP was successful in that the projects that 
received contracts appeared to satisfy the applicable statutory and regulatory objectives.  As a 
general matter, the structure of the Amended RFP evaluation framework was conducive to 
achieving this result.  Minimum statutory requirements had to be satisfied in the first stage 
evaluation while price was the predominant factor in the quantitative score received in the 
second stage evaluation.  Cost-effectiveness, whether the proposed PPA would facilitate 
financing of the proposed project, ranking in the second stage evaluation, and risk associated 
with project viability were all factors to be considered by the distribution companies in the third 
stage evaluation process. 
Moreover, by providing contracts to planned renewable energy facilities, as opposed to existing 
facilities, the Amended RFP solicitation process will contribute to the success of the 
Massachusetts RPS program by facilitating the construction of new Class I RPS-compliant 
facilities, which will provide incremental supply of RECs to help meet increasing RPS obligations 
in upcoming years as well as providing a price hedge for distribution company customers. 
                                                          
83 In some competitive solicitations, the most economically attractive bids may be evaluated as being above market.  This does not necessarily 
mean that the bids are economically unattractive, since the bids themselves are likely to be better evidence of market value than the forecast 
against which the bids are compared.  Nor are we suggesting that the Levitan forecast was unreasonable or too high. 
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The Department, through its analysis of the Cape Wind project and PPA with National Grid, 
determined that the Cape Wind project satisfied all of the minimum statutory criteria and 
provided considerable additional benefits, including enhancing reliability, increasing 
employment, and reducing future environmental compliance costs.  
 
D. Project Viability 
Another key criterion in evaluating the success of a solicitation process is the extent to which 
the projects receiving contracts are likely to be constructed—in other words, how viable are the 
projects for which contracts were obtained?  Indicia of project viability are the experience and 
track record of the developer, the developer’s financial strength and access to capital, its 
proposed use of commercial technology, and the development status of the project and 
prognosis for finalizing the development process, including obtaining required permits. 
All of the developers that received contracts are experienced renewable energy developers and 
plant owners with significant financial strength and/or access to capital—Iberdrola, First Wind, 
ArcLight, and Noble.84  All proposed to use commercial technology.  The proposed projects 
were all at the middle to late stage of development and without any apparent fatal flaws.   
These matters are taken into consideration in the bid evaluation process in several ways.  In the 
first stage evaluation, a developer must demonstrate site control, its proposed use of 
commercial technology, that it has a reasonable project schedule, that it has the ability to 
finance the proposed project and that it has some relevant experience.  The extent to which a 
developer can demonstrate these capabilities and show project development progress are non-
price factors considered in the second stage evaluation.  Finally, risk associated with project 
viability is a factor for consideration in the third stage evaluation. 
The structure of the Amended RFP process appropriately required that the indicia of project 
viability be considered in the evaluation process.  The ultimate measure of success is whether a 
high percentage of the projects under contract are constructed (and are built within a 
reasonable time).  Here, four of the five projects with PPAs arising out of the Amended RFP 
have already been built or are in construction.  That is a very good success rate.  Cape Wind, 
                                                          
84 Noble has assigned the PPA it executed with WMECO to Quantum Utility Generation, a company that has considerable financial strength and 
key employees with substantial industry experience. 
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meanwhile, has recently obtained DPU approval for its second PPA, now has two contracts for 
77.5 percent of its output, and is actively pursuing financing of its project. 
 
E. Reasonableness of the Distribution Companies’ Evaluation and Bid Selection Process  
On the whole, the distribution companies reasonably implemented the bid evaluation and 
selection framework set forth in the Amended RFP and the protocols for price and non-price 
evaluation developed by the distribution companies in consultation with DOER.  There were, 
however, a number of perceived shortcomings or perceived shortcomings, some of which were 
raised by the Attorney General’s expert witnesses, with suggestions for future improvements, 
in the DPU proceedings.  We address them below. 
1. Guidance regarding “Facilitation of Financing” 
The Attorney General suggested that future RFPs should provide more guidance on what is 
meant by whether a long-term contract would “facilitate financing” and how it should be 
considered in the evaluation process. 
One of the challenges in designing the RFP was to address the requirement in Section 83 that to 
be eligible for a long-term contract a renewable energy facility had to be built on or after 
January 1, 2008 while being responsive to the Department’s directive that in allocating the 
limited resource of Section 83 contracts “the distribution companies should be mindful of the 
express language of the statute, which calls upon distribution companies ‘to enter into cost-
effective long-term contracts to facilitate the financing of renewable energy generation.’” 
D.P.U. 10-58 at 6 citing GCA Section 83 (emphasis in original).   The distinction is that a planned 
facility might need a long-term contract in order to be financed and constructed but an existing 
facility, albeit recently built, would not in most conceivable circumstances have a similar need.  
The Amended RFP addressed this issue in the following ways: 
 In the first stage evaluation, a facility must have a commercial operation date on or after 
January 1, 2008 (or represent a capacity expansion or a repowering with a commercial 
operation date on or after January 1, 2008);85 
                                                          
85 Section 2.2.2.2.b.  
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 In the second stage evaluation, the distribution company is to consider the extent to 
which a PPA will facilitate financing (this would have a small impact on the quantitative 
second stage score, which includes price and non-price factors);86 
 In the third-stage evaluation, one of the factors that a distribution company could 
consider in ranking bids and making bid selections was “whether the proposed PPA will 
facilitate financing of the proposed project;”87 
 Bidders were asked to characterize the development status of the facility (i.e., whether 
it was planned, in operation, or in construction) and whether the project had already 
obtained financing and if not, explain how obtaining a long-term PPA would help the 
bidder to obtain financing for its proposed project.88 
The approach reflected in the Amended RFP was, in our opinion, appropriate at the time.  
However, subsequent to the Distribution Companies’ issuance of the Amended RFP, the 
Department, in its decision on the National Grid-Cape Wind PPA, determined that “Section 83 
requires electric distribution companies to demonstrate, as a threshold matter, that a proposed 
long-term contract will facilitate the financing of a renewable energy project.”89  Section 83A 
has similar language regarding “facilitation of financing.”  Hence, in future solicitations under 
Section 83A, the RFP should require a showing in the first evaluation stage—as a threshold 
matter—that a proposed PPA will facilitate financing of the proposed project. 
Based on our knowledge of the process and interviews with the Distribution Companies, it 
appears that the companies had somewhat differing interpretations of what did or did not 
constitute “facilitation of financing” in specific contexts.  In future DOER-coordinated 
solicitations, bid selection will be a joint process so there should be a more uniform approach in 
applying this requirement. 
The Department’s opinions have helped to clarify that “facilitation of financing” is a threshold 
requirement and that there are a variety of ways developers, whether they plan to use project 
financing or balance sheet financing, can demonstrate that a long-term PPA will assist them in 
their ability to finance their proposed project.  One utility representative opined that despite 
the instructions in the Amended RFP some of the bidders did not seem to understand the type 
                                                          
86 Section 2.3.2.2. 
87 Section 2.4. 
88 Bidder Response Package Sections 5.8 and 7.12. 
89 Massachusetts Electric Company and Nantucket Electric Company, each d/b/a National Grid, D.P.U. 10-54 (November 22, 2010) at 50. 
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of responses they were being asked to provide or the consequence if they did not provide a 
response indicating that a long-term PPA was important to financing construction of their 
proposed facility.  Providing more specific guidance in the next RFP consistent with the 
Department’s decisions would be helpful.  Making “facilitation of financing” a stage one 
threshold requirement would convey that it is a requirement, not just an evaluation factor.90    
2. Economic Evaluation Criteria 
The Amended RFP price evaluation had two components: 
 A comparison on a $/MWh basis of (a) the total cost of the products proposed 
(energy, RECs, and if accepted by a distribution company, capacity) to (b) the 
estimated market value of these products, using a common price forecast (70 
points); 
 The relative degree of front-loading of the proposed pricing (10 points).91 
Front-Loading 
The Attorney General’s witnesses suggested elimination of the separate assignment of 10 points for 
ascertaining degrees of front-loading—(a) because it should be reflected in discounting bid prices 
anyway and (b) because, as applied by NSTAR and WMECO, no distinction was created between bids, 
almost all of which received a score of 10.   
The specific method to evaluate frontloading was not included in the Amended RFP.  It was developed 
subsequently by the distribution companies and DOER as part of the bid evaluation protocol.  The 
evaluation metric gave 10 of 10 points to any bid that had a flat or escalating shape (i.e., it was not 
frontloaded).92  With regard to NSTAR’s and WMECO’s bid evaluations (which used the agreed-upon 
frontloading cost evaluation methodology), all or almost all of the bids submitted received 10 points.  
Consistent with industry practice the price bids were all flat or escalating over the contract term.  The 
                                                          
90 In fact, NSTAR in Section 2.2.2.6 of its  RFP for long-term contracts for SRECs issued in July 2012 has made it a stage one requirement that the 
bidder demonstrate that obtaining a long-term contract will facilitate the financing of its proposed project.  
http://www.nstar.com/docs3/energy_supplier/long-term/srec-rfp.pdf.  
91 The weighting between $/MWh cost/benefit and front-loading analysis was not specified in the RFP itself.  The front-loading criterion was 
requested by one of the distribution companies out of concern that a bidder might propose a declining price structure over the contract term 
instead of a flat or increasing price structure.  DOER’s consultants had not seen this evaluation criterion in a RFP; to the extent it is addressed, it 
is usually specified that a declining price structure is not allowable.  However, since the impact of this criterion was expected to be minimal 
(typically, bid price structures are flat or increasing), DOER consented to this approach as part of an overall package.  
 
92 This was a compromise between those that wanted a frontloading evaluation criterion and those that did not. 
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net effect of using the levelization price metric was neutral—it had no impact on the evaluation results.  
The Attorney General’s recommendation for elimination of the front-loading criterion is meritorious.  
For future RFPs, frontloading should be eliminated as a price-related evaluation criterion.  Rather, there 
should be an additional requirement that proposed pricing either be a flat $/MWh amount for the 
contract term or a $/MWh amount that is increasing over the contract term.   This would be consistent 
with industry practice and would avoid confusion.  The net $/MWh cost evaluation factor alone should 
be sufficient to evaluate the price of bids relative to their market value. 
Net Economic Benefit Evaluation Metric 
The Distribution Companies in coordination with DOER used a levelization approach to calculate the 
above/below market value of the bids on a $/MWh basis.  Economic evaluation of PPA proposals 
utilizing a comparison of costs to benefits (or market value) on a levelized basis is a common 
way that the economics of proposals are evaluated in solicitations involving long-term contracts 
for renewable energy.93  This evaluation metric allows for assessment of proposals with 
different quantities and different terms in a consistent and comparable basis and is easy to use.   
On the other hand, net present value of the net costs or benefits of a proposal is also a 
common and accepted economic evaluation metric (and was used by the DPU in assessing the 
net benefits of the Cape Wind PPA).  Under the Section 83A process, the Distribution Companies will 
be required to confer with the Attorney General and DOER regarding the “choice of contract methods 
and solicitation methods.”  Hence, this issue can and should be addressed at an early stage in the 
development of a future RFP. 
3. Consistency in Evaluation Methods 
Unitil did not apply the methodologies for the price evaluation developed by the distribution 
companies and DOER, but used its own approach.  While this practice was not material to the 
result, in the future, Distribution Companies should take steps to make sure that their 
evaluation methodologies conform with methodologies they have agreed to follow before they 
begin evaluation of bids.  This should be easier to monitor in the context of future joint 
solicitations under Section 83A.  
                                                          
93 In solicitations in California, Arizona, Delaware, Oklahoma, and Hawaii, a comparison of costs to benefits on a levelized basis (or simply a 
levelized cost approach in one instance) has been used for the economic evaluation.   See, e.g.  PG&E 2011 Renewables RFO Protocol, 
Attachment K at 3: “Market valuation considers how an Offer’s costs compares to its benefits, from a market perspective.  . . .  Costs and 
Benefits are each quantified and expressed in terms of present value (January 1, 2011 dollars) per MWh.  Market Value is Benefits minus 
Costs, and is expressed in terms of levelized price, that is, present value per MWh (2011 dollars and 2011 MWh),”  
http://www.pge.com/b2b/energysupply/wholesaleelectricsuppliersolicitation/renewables2011/index.shtml, 
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4. Approach to Short Listing 
The Attorney General’s witnesses suggested that future RFPs specify either minimum bid scores 
or minimum target quantity of bids or some other criteria for selecting a short list and a 
description of how the short list would be used in inviting rebids and in final contract selection.  
They also suggested that future RFPs specify when bid updates will be allowed (or not allowed). 
Generally, electric utilities in renewable energy solicitations have considerable discretion in 
terms of how many bids should be short listed and whether or not they should seek refreshed 
bids from the short list or some subset of the short list.  However, it is important that the 
distribution companies exercise their discretion in a reasonable manner.  In future solicitations, 
we suggest that the RFP specify that distribution companies may seek refreshed bids from 
either its entire short list or a subset of top-ranked bids on the short list.   This would be 
consistent with the Department’s comment in its NSTAR decision that “Going forward, where 
electric distribution companies determine that it is appropriate to solicit refreshed bids, the 
companies should ensure that all qualified bidders are allowed the opportunity to refresh 
bids.”94  Since under Section 83A, the bid selection process for a DOER-coordinated solicitation 
will be a joint process, not one conducted by each individual Distribution Company, there 
should be uniformity in the short listing process.  Again, the Attorney General as well as DOER 
will be able to provide their input to the Distribution Companies as part of the consultative 
process. 
5. Project and Contract Size vs. Distribution Company Need 
In their bid selection decisions, the smaller distribution companies, WMECO and Unitil, gave 
strong consideration to project and contract size relative to need.  Both selected proposals for 
the entire output of the products purchased from projects that were small enough such that 
the level of purchases did not greatly exceed the 3 percent minimum purchase requirement 
under Section 83.  In support of this approach, WMECO pointed to the “portfolio effect” 
criterion in the third stage evaluation—“portfolio effect: the value of diversity of resources—by 
size and type of resources.”95  Unitil indicated a concern about contracting with a larger project 
for substantially less than the full output of the project.  While not explicitly articulated by 
Unitil, there is a risk—called “subscription risk”—that a project that sells substantially less than 
the entire output of a project might not be able to finance and construct the project.   
                                                          
94 NSTAR Electric Company (August 19, 2011) at 44 n. 42. 
95 Amended RFP Section 2.4. 
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In our opinion, the focus of the smaller utilities in the third evaluation stage on selecting 
proposals that reasonably fit their need was reasonable in the particular context.83   However, 
it will not be relevant (or will at least be far less important) in the context of future joint 
solicitations since, under Section 83A joint solicitations, the Distribution Companies will enter 
into contracts with the winning bidders for their proportionate share of the products sold by 
the project based on their relative distribution loads. 
F. The Regulatory Path, Stakeholder Input and Value of a DOER-Coordinated 
Solicitation Process 
Under Section 83 and the Department’s applicable regulations, there were two regulatory 
approval processes for the solicitation—(1) Department review and approval of the timetable 
and method of solicitation contained in the RFP; and (2) Department review and approval of 
the PPA executed as a result of the RFP.  In fact, because of the changes to the Department’s 
regulations removing the Massachusetts geographical requirement as a result of the 
TransCanada litigation, the Department reviewed and approved both the Initial RFP and then 
the Amended RFP. 
The Department granted approvals of the RFPs in a relatively timely fashion, providing a degree 
of flexibility to the distribution companies and DOER, a joint petitioner with the Distribution 
Companies.  Indeed, DOER’s role as an active participant in the process of designing the RFP, 
and the expertise it contributed, was a basis for the Department deferring to the judgment of 
the joint petitioners in the RFP design phase.   
All three distribution companies that executed PPAs received approvals from the Department, 
with no opposition with respect to whether the PPAs merited approval.  The regulatory process 
proceeded smoothly with relatively few issues for Department decision.  DOER supported 
approval of all of the PPAs.  The relative ease of the regulatory process was reflective of the 
quality of the RFP and evaluation framework, the distribution companies’ efforts to fairly and 
effectively execute the solicitation process in accordance with the Amended RFP, and the role 
played by DOER.96 
Aside from the value added to the regulatory process, use of a DOER-coordinated solicitation 
process provided other advantages as well as some disadvantages.  First, it required a 
substantial investment of time and effort by the distribution companies and DOER to 
                                                          
96 Future involvement by the Attorney General in the RFP development process (through its consultative role) could further assist in facilitating 
and expediting the regulatory review process. 
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collaborate to produce a single RFP document, bid response package, bid evaluation protocol, 
and Model PPA.  The process might have taken additional time compared to individual 
Distribution Company solicitation processes.  On the other hand, this collaborative process 
likely contributed to a better quality solicitation than would likely have been the case if each 
distribution company pursued individual solicitations.   Each of the parties made major 
contributions to the process.  DOER contributed consultants experienced in utility solicitations 
for renewable energy under long-term contracts, who, among other things, drafted RFP 
documents.  National Grid and NSTAR provided outside counsel, who provided considerable 
assistance with regard to the Model PPA and regulatory matters.  All of the Distribution 
Companies provided considerable internal resources, with substantial collective experience, 
expertise, and insight.  DOER provided personnel to oversee the process.   
DOER provided other contributions as well.  It met with representatives of the development 
community to obtain input on a Model PPA and through its efforts was able to address some 
developer concerns through development of the Model PPA.  The opportunity for formal 
stakeholder input into the process was extensive—with (1) the DPU’s promulgation of 
regulations under Section 83, (2) approval of the timetable and method for solicitation and 
execution of contracts for the Initial RFP, (3) the DPU’s amendment of its regulations following 
the TransCanada lawsuit, (4) approval of the timetable and method for solicitation of contracts 
for the Amended RFP, and, (5) with the DPU’s approval of executed contracts. However, the 
informal stakeholder input process employed by the Distribution Companies, in coordination 
with DOER, even before the proposed Initial RFP was submitted to the DPU (as well as DOER’s 
stakeholder efforts to obtain input regarding the Model PPA) provided additional opportunity 
for stakeholder input.   
There were other benefits for the Distribution Companies.  By utilizing a common price 
forecast, the cost of which was shared among the distribution companies, the cost associated 
with the conduct of the solicitation was mitigated.  Moreover, a common market price forecast 
was helpful to parties and the Department in the regulatory process.   
All in all, the Distribution Companies expressed satisfaction with the RFP process and its results.  
From a developer standpoint, the conduct of a solicitation by multiple utilities simultaneously 
using the same procurement documents enabled developers to reach a larger market at a 
lower cost of time, effort, and money than if utilities had conducted their own independent 
solicitations.   
Study on Long-Term Contracting Under Section 83  December 14, 2012 Discussion Draft, Page 50 
 
 
Future joint solicitations under Section 83A should entail joint bid selection and more 
consistency among the Distribution Companies in the bid evaluation process and in contract 
terms.    
 
G. The Model PPA and Risk Allocation Issues 
1. Overview 
It took considerable time and effort for the Distribution Companies and DOER to agree on a 
Model PPA.  As a result, the Model PPA was not submitted to the Department at the time the 
distribution companies and DOER sought approval of the Initial RFP.  The joint petitioners 
stated, and the Department agreed, that submission of a Model PPA for Department review 
and approval was not required under Section 83 and the Department’s regulations.  Moreover, 
requiring such a review would have entailed substantial delays in the solicitation process. 
Under the circumstances, the approach taken with respect to the Model PPA was appropriate.  
However, in the future, it would provide for a more transparent process if a Model PPA was 
submitted to the Department for informational purposes at the same time approval was sought 
for the timetable and method of solicitation and execution of contracts.  We appreciate and 
agree with the Department’s reluctance to step in and decide disputes over terms to be 
included in a Model PPA when bidders have the ability to propose exceptions to the Model PPA 
when they submit their bids.   However, by providing a Model PPA solely on an informational 
basis, if there are any particularly critical issues associated with a Model PPA, such as provisions 
that would clearly make a PPA non-financeable, and which cannot reasonably be addressed 
through the process of proposing exceptions when bids are submitted, there would be the 
opportunity for interested parties to raise the issues and for the Department to address them, if 
necessary, before the bid submittal process begins.  Since the Model PPA would not be 
submitted for approval, the DPU would be under no obligation to consider issues raised by 
stakeholders regarding contract provisions unless the Department decided to do so. 
Based on our interviews, the general assessment was that the Model PPA was a fair document 
as a basis for receiving offers.  Also, the Distribution Companies were viewed as acting 
responsibly for the most part in response to suggested contract changes proposed by bidders. 
2. Change in RPS Law 
There was, however, one notable exception pertaining to NSTAR’s actions with respect to the 
change in law provisions regarding RPS qualification.  After considerable discussions, the 
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Distribution Companies and DOER agreed on Model PPA provisions whereby (1) the Seller 
represents and warrants that it shall be an RPS Class 1 Renewable Generation Unit qualified by 
DOER to participate in the RPS program (Section 7.2(g)), but (2) if there is a change in law 
affecting qualification as a RPS Class 1 Renewable Generation Unit, “Seller shall only be 
required to use commercially reasonable efforts to ensure that all Energy provided by Seller to 
Buyer from the Facility under this Agreement meets the requirements for eligibility pursuant to 
the RPS after that change in Law.” (Section 4.7(b)).  The concept is that if the Legislature or 
DOER changed the RPS qualification rules in a manner that was commercially reasonable for a 
seller to comply with, for example, if new reporting requirements were mandated, the seller 
would be responsible for compliance.  If, on the other hand, new rules, by way of example 
required all wind turbines to have a minimum size of 4 MW each, a wind farm would not be 
required to replace all its 2 MW wind turbines with 4 MW wind turbines—the expense would 
not be a commercially reasonable one.   
Both in the Initial RFP and Amended RFP, the Model PPA with these provisions was posted on 
the RFP website.  In the process of dealing with shortlisted bidders, NSTAR took the position 
that the sellers, not the buyers, must take the change in law risk.    
NSTAR indicated that it changed course on this issue in the context of DOER’s deciding to 
change its regulations regarding qualification standards for biomass facilities.  However, it 
appears that all of the projects that were subject to NSTAR’s negotiation approach were wind 
projects in ISO-New England, for which there would appear to be low change in law risk. 
NSTAR signed two PPAs with Iberdrola and one PPA with First Wind, in which the seller takes 
the change in law risk.97  If the wind projects no longer qualify for the RPS, NSTAR would no 
longer have to pay for the RECs.  However, NSTAR would still be responsible for paying for the 
energy under the PPAs.98 
As indicated before, Iberdrola finances its projects based on its own balance sheet.  It did not 
plan on seeking project debt or tax equity.  Iberdrola apparently made the decision that the risk 
of a change in RPS law affecting its projects’ RPS qualifications was very low and it made 
commercial sense to assume the risk. 
                                                          
97 See Transcript pp. 175-181, hearing held on June 14, 2011, NSTAR Electric Company, D.P.U. 11-05/11-06/11-07. 
98 Id. 
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First Wind planned to use project financing, like most other developers.  In connection with 
NSTAR’s reallocation of the change in law risk, First Wind adjusted the allocation between 
energy and REC prices so that the REC price dropped substantially (and the energy price 
increased).99  This reduced First Wind’s change in law risk since NSTAR would continue having 
the obligation to purchase the energy.  However, NSTAR would continue having the obligation 
to purchase energy, which could be at an above-market price. 
There are several concerns regarding NSTAR’s negotiation approach.  Change in RPS law 
provisions are material terms in a Model PPA and bear upon financeability for project-financed 
projects, cost to ratepayers for this risk to be assumed by sellers, and competitive balance 
between the small minority of bidders capable of balance sheet financing and the large majority 
of bidders planning to use project financing.  First, it is poor practice in a competitive bidding 
process to solicit bids based on a specified risk allocation framework and then to change that 
once bids are received in a manner disadvantageous to bidders.  This is especially true after the 
Model PPA, including the provisions at issue, had been agreed upon after substantial 
discussions with DOER and the other Distribution Companies. 
Based on the interviews conducted as well as our general industry knowledge, debt and tax 
equity investors would be reluctant to invest in a project where the seller would assume the 
change in RPS law risk or if they would consider investing, would not consider (or would sharply 
discount) the expected revenues associated with the sale of RECs.  This would likely result in 
lower amounts of debt which would need to be replaced with higher cost equity.  In addition, 
interest rates and other financial terms may become more expensive.  The result would likely 
be a substantial risk premium that ratepayers would incur.  The reason lenders (and tax equity) 
will not assume this risk is that it is beyond the control of the seller, especially since the change 
can be made by regulation or statute—it is essentially a political risk.   
Use of this provision in the future would likely have the following effects:  
 Potentially reducing participation by bidders; 
 Increasing bid prices; 
 Providing a competitive advantage for the few firms that don’t use project finance at the 
expense of the many who rely on project finance. 
Section 83 (and Section 83A) has a provision that is pertinent. 
                                                          
99 Id. at 177. 
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If the RPS requirements of said section 11F of said chapter 25A [the RPS law] should ever 
terminate, the obligation to continue periodic solicitations to enter into long term contracts 
shall cease, but contracts already executed and approved by the department of public 
utilities shall remain in full force and effect.  
While not dispositive of how the change in law risk should be addressed under Section 83 PPAs, 
the requirement that sellers’ contract rights should continue in effect even if the RPS is 
terminated suggests that this should include the right to continue to receive payment for RECs 
even a project no longer qualifies under the RPS due to a change in law that is not the fault of 
the seller.  That is the case with the National Grid and NSTAR PPAs with Cape Wind as well as 
the PPAs executed by WMECO and Unitil, which incorporated the Model PPA provisions 
regarding RPS change in law risk. 
It is possible that a bidding process could include tradeoffs between price and allocation of 
change in law risk by allowing bids with and without the RPS risk being assumed by the 
seller.100  However, it would be counterproductive to either (a) require the seller to assume 
the RPS change in law risk or (b) try to reallocate the risk to the seller after bids are submitted 
where, under the Model PPA, the buyer assumes the risk.   While it does not appear that the 
ultimate result of the Amended RFP was substantially impacted by NSTAR’s behavior, this 
practice should not be repeated in the future.   
3. Federal Tax Benefits 
The Model PPA allocated to the seller the risk of the seller’s inability to qualify for the PTC, the 
ITC, or other federal tax benefit.  Under the Model PPA, the seller would be required to perform 
even if it was ineligible for a federal tax benefit.  The reason for this was that at the time the 
Initial RFP and Amended RFP were developed, it appeared that bidders would or should have a 
very good chance of their projects going in service before the then-deadline for the PTC and 
ITC—December 31, 2012.   It was thought that projects that were late in going into service or 
were on a later time schedule should be prepared to take the risk (although the Model PPA 
provisions were subject to negotiation).   
                                                          
100
 While bidders should be able to bid different energy and REC prices, the Distribution Companies should be able 
to require a readjustment of the prices to reflect the relative estimated value of the different products.   It is not 
the same for a seller to accept the RPS change in law risk through a REC price offer that is 10% percent of its total 
price as compared to a REC price offer that is 40% of its total price.  There is a difference in risk allocation, as a 
practical matter. 
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This issue was addressed very differently in the Cape Wind PPAs with National Grid and NSTAR.  
Due to the long lead time of the Cape Wind project and its longer construction period 
compared to onshore wind projects, it made sense for the risk of non-eligibility for federal tax 
benefits to be allocated between the parties by price adjustment provisions in the PPA.101 
In light of the uncertainty regarding extension of the PTC (and other federal tax benefits), the 
length of any extension, and any changes to the form or amount of the PTC, the Distribution 
Companies in consultation with DOER and the Attorney General should consider what the best 
approach should be for addressing this matter in terms of the structure of the RFP and the 
Model PPA.  This is a non-trivial issue as the value of the PTC, assuming that it is extended in its 
current form, is $22/MWh for 10 years increasing with inflation on a pre-tax basis (the after-tax 
value is higher). 
 
IV. Conclusion 
Based on the interviews conducted and our knowledge of the electric power industry, our 
major conclusions are as follows: 
 Long-term contracts for energy and RECs are, and will be, necessary for Massachusetts 
to meet the goals under its RPS with respect to Class 1 Renewable Generating Units; 
 There are an insufficient number of creditworthy entities willing to enter into long-term 
contracts with renewable energy developers for multi-MW grid-connected projects in 
the absence of a mandate on the Distribution Companies to do so; 
 The long-term contracting requirements under Section 83 reasonably fulfill the need for 
long-term contracts and reasonably support the renewable energy goals of the 
commonwealth; 
 There is a general consensus that the RFP process employed under Section 83 was, for 
the most part, well conducted, fair and produced good results; 
 There were a few shortcomings in the RFP process under Section 83, which can, and are 
likely to be, rectified in future Section 83A solicitations, because of modifications to 
future solicitation processes mandated by Section 83A and as a result of “lessons 
learned” from the Section 83 procurements. 
                                                          
101 Specifically, in  the Cape Wind PPA, the base price is increased if on the date the Facility is placed in service the Facility qualifies for the PTC 
but not the ITC.  There is a further increase in price if the Facility qualifies for neither the PTC nor ITC.  See Cape Wind First Amendment to 
PPA-1, Appendix X to Exhibit E.  
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APPENDIX 
 
QUALIFICATIONS OF CONSULTING TEAM 
 
Peregrine Energy Group, Inc. is an energy consulting company specializing in renewable 
energy and energy efficiency.  Founded in Boston in 1992, Peregrine’s practice is based 
on a thorough understanding of energy policies, regulations, programs, markets and 
data.  The senior professionals of the firm have many years of experience with utility 
regulation and the competitive energy markets in New England in general, and with 
renewable energy in particular.  
Paul Gromer, President and Founder of Peregrine Energy Group, is a former 
Commissioner of DOER.  He has been an active participant in Massachusetts regulatory 
and policy proceedings, including the introduction of competitive markets in the 
restructuring of the electric industry as well as recent policies to stimulate development 
of generation from renewable projects.   
Francis Cummings of Peregrine is an energy economist and a former Policy Director for 
the Massachusetts Technology Collaborative, where he led the development of the 
state’s program (“MGPP”) that conducted competitive solicitations for long-term 
purchase and option contracts for RECs to support renewable project financing.  His 
experience also includes financial analysis of the impact of power purchase contracts 
and power prices on project financing for renewable power generation.  Mr. Cummings 
has served as a Principal at KEMA Consulting, where he directed XENERGY multi-client 
studies and engagements in renewable energy and state energy policy.  He has been a 
Member of the EPRI Public Advisory Group on Energy Efficiency/Smart Grid (2007 - 
2009).  He has testified or prepared energy policy and regulatory filings in 
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maine, New York and New Jersey.  He is a graduate of 
Harvard College. 
 
New Energy Opportunities, Inc. (“NEO”) is a consulting firm with a focus on the 
procurement and sale of electric power and other products from generation facilities, 
especially those using renewable resources. Barry Sheingold, President of NEO, has over 
20 years of experience in the design and structuring of long-term contracts for the 
purchase and sale of electric power, the design of competitive procurements, evaluating 
bids, and oversight of solicitations, including considerable experience with competitive 
procurements for long-term contracts involving renewable energy projects.  
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NEO has provided consulting assistance in the renewable energy field in a variety of 
capacities and has worked for different types of clients.  In 2009-2011, Mr. Sheingold 
advised the Massachusetts Department of Energy Resources regarding its collaboration 
with the Commonwealth’s investor-owned utilities on a joint renewable energy RFP 
under Section 83 of the Green Communities Act.  Previously, Mr. Sheingold advised the 
Massachusetts Technology Collaborative and the New York State Energy Research and 
Development Authority regarding the design of competitive procurement processes for 
the purchase of Renewable Energy Certificates under long-term contracts.  He also 
conducted surveys of bidders and other stakeholders in the context of evaluation of 
these solicitations.  In addition, he has advised the Delaware Public Service commission 
with respect to the development of a Solar Renewable Energy Credit procurement pilot 
program for Delmarva Power & Light Company. 
Mr. Sheingold has performed an independent evaluator function for renewable energy 
RFPs in several states, including California, Oklahoma, Delaware and Hawaii, where he 
has authored or co-authored a variety of evaluation reports on solicitation processes 
over the past several years.  More recently, he has served as Independent Evaluator 
with respect to Southern California Edison Company’s implementation of California’s 
Combined Heat and Power Program.   
Mr. Sheingold has also served as an expert witness on a variety of matters, including 
testimony with respect to wind energy power purchase agreements in Oklahoma and 
Delaware, a proposed biomass cogeneration project in Nova Scotia, a proposed fuel cell 
project in Delaware, confidentiality issues with regard to a competitive bidding process 
for conventional generation in Quebec, and a long-term solar renewable energy credit 
purchase contract in Delaware. 
 
Mr. Sheingold has advised a variety of private and public clients in the negotiation of 
electric power transactions and in related due diligence involving the sale or purchase of 
electric power products, project sales, and other commercial transactions. 
 
Mr. Sheingold was formerly Senior Vice President of Citizens Power LLC, the nation’s 
pioneering electric power marketing company, where he served in a senior business 
capacity after serving as General Counsel. Previously, Mr. Sheingold worked for 
Delmarva Power and Light Company, Delmarva’s independent power development 
affiliate, Delmarva Capital Technology Company, and the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission. He is a graduate of Boston College Law School (cum laude) and New 
College, now the honors college of the Florida university system. 
